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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Event Perception
by
Emily Prychitko
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2021
Professor Casey O’Callaghan, Chair
We seem to perceive events, like songs playing, thunderstorms, and people having conversations.
Extensive empirical research suggests that we indeed perceive events. Yet the philosophy of
perception has not addressed event perception much at all. I lay out goals and methods for a
fruitful philosophical investigation of event perception, then pursue that investigation. Primarily
on the basis of the empirical evidence, I argue that we perceive events across the senses, and that
event representations are a unique type of perceptual representation. In doing so, I address
concerns about event perception as such, relative to object and property perception. I argue,
furthermore, that event representations are sui generis, and that we typically perceptually
attribute temporal boundness only to events. I end by noting potential directions for future work
on event perception.

iv

1 Investigating Event Perception

It seems that humans perceive events frequently. We seem to see cars moving from one location
to another, commercials playing, people having conversations. We seem to hear songs playing,
phones ringing, footsteps approaching. We seem to feel breezes blowing, massages, the washing
of our hands. We furthermore seem to be able to form beliefs about and act on the basis of the
events we apparently perceive. When we hear the phone ringing, we may in effect believe that
someone is calling us and, accordingly, answer the phone.
Empirical psychology provides further reason to think that we indeed perceive events.
Behavioral, psychological, and neural indices show that we parse ongoing perceptual scenes into
discrete events (Zacks et al. 2007; Radvansky and Zacks 2017). For example, when shown a
movie, participants mark when one event depicted in the movie has ended and another has
begun reliably (Zacks et al. 2007). Where participants place these marks affects what they
remember from the movie and how accurate their memory of the movie is (Radvansky and
Zacks 2017). These marks are correlated with spikes in the activity of certain neural regions,
which occur even when participants are not instructed to mark the boundaries between
successive events (Zacks et al. 2010).
More work is required to establish that we in fact perceive events, and that event perception
isn’t just a special case of object or property perception. But the existence of the psychological
literature on event perception in addition to the intuitive case for event perception is reason to
investigate the matter more thoroughly.
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The philosophy of perception, however, has not addressed event perception much at all. It
tends to focus on our perception of objects and properties. For instance, discussions about
illusion, hallucination, and veridical perception are most often cast in terms of (non-)veridically
perceiving an object as having certain properties (e.g., Brewer 2008; Fish 2010; Crane 2006).
Discussions about which contents we perceptually represent are most often about which objects
and properties we represent, and what the structures of those representations are (e.g., Siegel
2006; Block 2014; Green 2018).
There has been some talk of event perception in the philosophy of perception, but it would
benefit from pursuing a more directed approach to event perception as such. For instance, some
have argued that we perceive objects and properties, and because events are just another kind of
particular that we are presented with in our environment, we also perceive events (Burge 2010;
Schellenberg 2018, 2016). Yet there are reasons to doubt that events are just as perceptible as
objects and properties, since events appear to have distinctive temporal features that are not
obviously perceptible (e.g., James 1886), and a common metaphysical view is that events are just
objects and properties in the world (Kim 1976). Some have claimed that we perceptually
discriminate events in addition to objects and properties (Schellenberg 2018, 2016), but it has yet
to be explored which exact discriminatory capacities we have with respect to events. Some have
claimed that event perception and object perception differ in important ways (Burge 2010), but
what exactly these differences come to is unclear. Resolving these and other issues relevant to
event perception can be aided by engaging with the decades-long empirical literature on event
perception, which has not yet been incorporated into the philosophical talk of event perception.
In this chapter, I will point to a number of aspects of the existing philosophical talk about
event perception that can be improved upon, and I will suggest how to do so. By offering a set of

2

goals and methods, I hope to take steps towards creating a more directed, fruitful philosophical
investigation of event perception.

1.1 Do we perceive events?
An inquiry into event perception should first and foremost attempt to answer the question of
whether we ever perceive events. Some philosophers have claimed that we do, without giving an
argument that is very specific to event perception (Burge 2010; Schellenberg 2018, 2016;
Soteriou 2010). For instance, Burge and Schellenberg focus on perception of objects and
property-instances in their projects. Their motivation for admitting perception of events is that
events are just another kind of particular (in addition to objects and property-instances) that we
are presented with in our environment, so given that we perceive objects and property-instances,
we also perceive events (e.g., Burge 2010, pp. 32, 39-40, 84; Schellenberg 2018, pp. 15, 16, 27;
Schellenberg 2016, pp. 27, 29, 38). Soteriou assumes that we have perceptual experiences as of
events in addition to objects and properties (2010, p. 226), then goes on to investigate the
phenomenal character of those perceptual experiences.
The quickness of these moves would not be particularly problematic if perception of events,
relative to perception of objects and properties, did not appear to raise any distinctive issues. Yet
it seems there are special problems of event perception. For one thing, events appear to have
certain features that objects and properties do not have, like beginning, unfolding across time,
and ending. Whether those features are perceptible is an issue that must be explored in its own
right, before we can claim justifiably that we perceive events.
In fact, there are reasons to positively doubt that we perceive events, even after granting that
we perceive objects and properties. A common metaphysical view about events is that events
reduce to other kinds (e.g., Kim 1976; Lewis 1986). Suppose, for instance, that events are,
3

fundamentally, nothing but objects and properties in the world. One possibility is that we
perceptually represent events to be something other than mere objects and properties. If so, it
could be that all of our perceptual representations as of events are inaccurate, since events just
are objects and properties, so we never perceive events veridically. Another possibility is that we
perceptually represent events to indeed be sets of objects and properties. In this case, it could be
that our perceptual representations as of events are sometimes accurate, but that perceiving or
perceptually representing events is not interestingly different than perceiving or perceptually
representing objects and properties; in fact, the former may simply reduce to the latter. It may be
faulty, then, to talk about perceiving or perceptually representing events in addition to objects and
properties.
This is a line of doubt that a proponent of event perception should at least contend with.
Another doubt about event perception stems from the view that events essentially take time to
unfold; an event, unlike an object, does not exist fully in a single moment. Suppose we have
listened to a song. It may be impossible for us to have perceived the song itself. At any moment
during which the song was playing, we were not perceiving the entire song, of course; we were at
most perceiving a single temporal part of it, while the entire song consists in all of its temporal
parts. At any moment, we could not perceive the temporal parts of it that had already occurred
or had yet to occur; we could at best remember the parts that had already passed and expect those
that had yet to come, but remembering and expecting are cognitive phenomena, not perceptual
phenomena. Thus, the thought goes, we could not have perceived the song itself, but only
temporal parts of it.
There is, in fact, an entire literature on precisely this puzzle of ‘temporal perception’, which
includes, but is not limited to, event perception. The puzzle is how to reconcile the apparent facts
that we can perceive temporal features (like duration, order, beginning and ending, etc.) and that
4

perception is limited to what exists in this very moment, rather than what has passed or what will
come (e.g., James 1886; LePoidevin 2004; Hoerl 2013; Phillips 2014).
To claim justifiably that we perceive (or perceptually represent) events, we must give an
argument that avoids or, minimally, contends with objections like these, which cast doubt on the
occurrence of event perception, at least in addition to object and property perception. It is not
sufficient to assume that events, being simply another type of particular in the world, are just as
perceptible as objects and properties. The fact that events apparently have interesting temporal
features that distinguish them from objects and properties, and the commonness of the view that
events are not a fundamental metaphysical kind, demand a more nuanced approach to the
phenomenon of event perception. It would be a step forward to make explicit the various features
of the events whose perceptibility is being considered, and develop an argument for event
perception that respects any relevant differences between events, objects, and properties.
A good example of such a nuanced approach to event perception is the philosophical
literature on auditory perception. The common view in that literature is that what we hear are
sounds, and sounds are events (O’Callaghan 2007; Casati and Dokic 1994). Many relevant issues
have been explored extensively, such as what the features of sounds are (O’Callaghan 2007), why
sounds are events instead of objects or properties (O’Callaghan 2007; Nudds 2015), what the
part-whole relationship between multiple sounds is (Matthen 2010; Nudds 2010), and how
sounds are perceptually represented (Nudds 2015).
Perhaps the existence of a strong, independent case for auditory event perception can justify
the occasional claims that we perceive events. Perhaps the work on auditory event perception has
tackled the problems unique to event perception sufficiently to warrant the claims that events,
like objects and properties, are particulars that we can perceive. There is, after all, a strong case
for object perception in the literature (e.g., Clark 2004; Burge 2010; Brewer 2007; Cohen 2004),
5

so not everyone who claims that we perceive objects in addition to properties must present their
own case for it. Perhaps the same goes for claiming that we perceive events in addition to objects
and properties.
It would be perfectly acceptable to refer to the literature on auditory perception to justify the
claims that we hear events, or we perceive events auditorily. But it seems like those who claim that
we perceive events as well as objects and properties sometimes intend to maintain a stronger
claim. For instance, Burge (2010), Schellenberg (2018, 2016), and Soteriou (2010) all claim to be
developing projects about perception in general, rather than just audition. Burge and
Schellenberg talk extensively about vision in particular, but also make mention of other senses,
like audition and touch. Neither Burge, Schellenberg, nor Soteriou say explicitly that their claims
about event perception are restricted to auditory event perception. They are suggesting, then, if
not actively maintaining, that we perceive events in senses other than just audition, like vision, or
touch, etc.
Even if the existing arguments in favor of auditory event perception are successful, however,
they cannot be used to support the claim that we perceive events through multiple different
senses, rather than just through audition. At least, not without further work. For one thing, it is
faulty to infer that just because a type of item is perceptible through one sense that it is thereby
perceptible through other senses (O’Callaghan 2019). It is clear, for instance, that certain
properties are perceptible only via a certain sense, like color for vision and pitch for audition.
Furthermore, several of the existing arguments for auditory event perception are premised on
there being significant differences between the items targeted in audition and the items targeted in
vision (O’Callaghan 2007, 2008). One reason to think that the items targeted in audition are
events, rather than objects, is that we cannot hear the spatial organization of objects (such as their
spatial boundaries, spatial parts, or spatial continuity despite occlusion), but we can see this spatial
6

organization. Perceiving spatial organization is essential to perceiving objects, while perceiving
temporal organization (such as an item’s beginning, unfolding, and ending) is essential to
perceiving events. And we indeed hear the temporal organization of events (see O’Callaghan 2008,
pp. 816-824).
The differences between the items of audition and the items of vision motivate the view that we
perceive events auditorily. We cannot, then, treat the arguments for auditory event perception as
supporting visual (or tactile, or multisensory, etc.) event perception. If we perceive objects through
a given modality – which, I’ll assume, we do at least through vision, touch, and multisensory
perception –, then it remains an open question whether we also perceive events through that
modality. Even if the arguments for auditory event perception are successful, they do not
establish that we perceive events through the modalities that we perceive objects by means of,
since they treat the fact that hearing sounds does not meet the requirements for object perception
as a reason for thinking that we hear events. It has yet to be explored philosophically whether we
perceive events through the modalities that we perceive objects by means of, and, if so, whether
our perceptual representations of events are reducible to our perceptual representations of objects
in these modalities. These are issues that ought to be addressed in an investigation of event
perception.
New arguments are needed, then, to establish that we perceive events through senses other
than just audition. One method of argumentation would proceed sense by sense, establishing that
we perceive events in vision, then establishing that we perceive events in touch, etc. A different
method would approach event perception sense-neutrally, wherein the arguments for event
perception would apply to whichever modalities we perceive events by means of. This method
would be more general than the sense-by-sense method, since it would abstract from the
particularities of any unisensory, or the multisensory, form of event perception. It would leave
7

open questions about potential differences between the various forms of event perception. Either
method would be a promising way to argue for event perception across the senses (i.e., in senses
other than just audition).
While developing a case for or against event perception across the senses, it would be helpful
to get clear on what event perception, rather than object or property perception, consists in or
requires. Schellenberg, for instance, has suggested that when perceiving, we “discriminate and
single out particulars” (e.g., 2018, p. 34; 2016, p. 36), and the relevant particulars are sometimes
events. What it means to ‘discriminate events’ is not immediately obvious, as philosophers use
‘discriminate’ in a number of different ways. Using different meanings of ‘discriminate’ from the
literature, to ‘discriminate events’ might mean to discriminate events from a background
(O’Callaghan 2008; Green 2019), or to discriminate different events from each other across time
(LePoidevin 2004; Butterfill 2009), or to discriminate events from objects (Burge 2010), or to
discriminate different types of events (Butterfill 2009), or to discriminate events that have
different arrangements of the same features in a scene (Clark 2004). The various interpretations
of the claim that we discriminate events have different truth conditions, so clarification is
important.
It is a task in its own right to discover which particular discriminatory capacities we have with
respect to events, if any. Consider, for instance, the ability to discriminate particulars of a given
type in a scene, like discriminating and singling out an instance of red (Schellenberg 2018, p. 26;
2016, p. 37). If we are similarly able to discriminate events of a given type in a scene (Schellenberg
2018, p. 35), a pressing question is what the relevant types of events are. That is, among all of the
events in the world, which are the ones that we can discriminate in a scene? Can we discriminate
weddings, conversations, elections, and wars? Or only very basic events, like an object moving,
changing color, or breaking apart? Can we discriminate long events, like calendar years, seasons,
8

and semesters, or only short events, like songs, handshakes, and commercials? Can we
discriminate slow-paced events, like tomatoes ripening and people growing taller, or only fasterpaced events, like cars driving down the street or people going for walks? These are some of
questions that we should attempt to answer in an investigation of event perception, insofar as
discrimination of events in a scene is relevant to event perception.
Consider, as well, the ability to discriminate particulars of a given type from particulars of
another type, such as our ability to discriminate red from blue (Schellenberg 2018, p. 2; 2016, p.
36). Having this discriminatory capacity with respect to events could mean that we discriminate
events from objects and properties. Whether we can in fact tell events apart from mere objects
and properties in the same perceptual scene must be investigated. Alternatively, having this
discriminatory capacity with respect to events could mean that we discriminate different types of
events from each other. Is our discriminatory capacity fine-grained enough for us to tell that a
movie is different than a commercial, or that one person’s singing is different than another’s, or
that baking a cake is different than baking cookies? Maintaining that we can discriminate
different types of events from each other will require going into some detail about how fine-tuned
our discriminatory capacities are with respect to event types.
Discovering which events are discriminable in a scene and which are not, whether events are
discriminable from objects and properties in a scene, and which events are discriminable from
each other are just some of the issues that ought to be explored in an investigation of event
perception, granting that discrimination is relevant to perception. Each of these particular issues
demands attention in its own right, for each is relevant to determining whether we perceive
events and what event perception amounts to.
A philosophical investigation of event perception would also benefit from incorporating the
decades-long empirical literature on event perception. It contains valuable information about
9

how we perceive events – how we perceptually individuate events, which features we perceptually
attribute to events, how we perceptually represent events, how event perception differs from
object perception, etc. The literature does not completely answer many of the questions that
ought to be asked in a philosophical investigation of event perception, but it is nevertheless an
excellent source of evidence. For example, it supports the claim that we perceive events, but it is
not obvious that the literature establishes that claim decisively. Much of the evidence that has
been gathered is behavioral, and given the many intermediary steps between perception and
behavior, we cannot simply assume that the behaviors that correspond with presentation of events
are indicative of perception of those events. If we wish to make claims about event perception, we
ought not merely point to the empirical literature on event perception, then, but engage with it.
Because the literature contains relevant information about event perception and rules out many
plausible claims about event perception, it should be employed when arguing for and
disambiguating claims about event perception in philosophy.
While the questions of whether we discriminate and perceive events are important for a
discussion of event perception, an equally important question is what it even means to say that
we perceive events. More specifically, which events in the world are the candidates for ‘event
perception’? Are movies, waves rolling in, lights turning on, acts of vengeance, beeps, deceptive
cadences in music, traffic jams, explosions, seasons, construction of buildings, books sitting on
shelves, the ripening of fruits, taps on the shoulder, and climate change all possible targets of
event perception? To talk about ‘event perception’ meaningfully, we must stipulate the domain of
events in the world whose perceptibility is being considered, as well as offer reasons to think that
everything within that domain is indeed an event. Otherwise, it will be unclear why ‘event
perception’ is so-called, and what its intended scope is.
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Just as well, we ought to be able to rule out, right from the start, some of the apparent
perceptual phenomena that do not count as ‘event perception’, and rule in some of the apparent
perceptual phenomena that do count. Are instances of apparently perceiving an apple sitting on
a table, a song playing, a fan blowing, a light flickering, and an insulting remark candidates for
‘event perception’, or not? What about instances of apparently perceiving the first few seconds of
a commercial, the browning of leaves throughout fall, a cat entering the living room, or the
sequence ‘cat enters living room, TV turns off, phone rings’? Again, to begin to discuss ‘event
perception’ meaningfully, we must point to some of the apparent perceptual phenomena that are
clear candidates for ‘event perception’ and some of the phenomena that are not candidates at all.
There will surely be many tricky cases that cannot be labelled right from the start, and will
instead have to be addressed after a better conception of what event perception consists in has
been developed.
To even say, then, that we ‘perceive events’ (or that we do not), and for this to be a
meaningful statement, we must clarify our domain, both on the perceptual side of things and on
the outside world side of things, at least to some degree. Without this initial work, any claim
about our (not) ‘perceiving events’ will remain vague.
To move the existing philosophical talk about event perception forward, then, it would be
helpful to address the special problems posed by event perception (compared to object and
property perception), to argue for or against event perception across the senses, to get clear on
which discriminatory capacities we do or do not have with respect to events, to incorporate the
empirical literature on event perception, and to do some ground-clearing work about the
intended scope of ‘event perception’.
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1.2 How does event perception relate to other perceptual phenomena?
An investigation of event perception would do well to address not only the question of whether
we perceive events, but also the question of how event perception relates to other perceptual
phenomena that philosophers are interested in. A significant question is what the relation is
between event perception and object perception. Some questionable claims have been made
about this relation. For instance, Burge (2010) says that we perceptually discriminate objects from
events thanks to the fact that our perceptual tracking of objects differs from our perceptual
tracking of events (e.g., p. 459). For Burge, perceptual tracking is simply perceptual
reidentification of an item across time. Burge says that with respect to tracking objects, “The
tracking must be linked to certain perceptual anticipations – particularly those regarding
maintenance of integrity of boundaries” (p. 459), and, “Bodies are perceptually distinguishable
partly and fundamentally through their continuity of boundary integrity over time” (p. 199). He
does not say anything positive about how we track events, but we can infer that he thinks it does
not involve perceptual anticipations about the maintenance of spatial boundaries.
It is unclear whether the relevant spatial boundaries whose maintenance we do not anticipate
while tracking events are the spatial boundaries of the event itself, or the spatial boundaries of the
objects that participate in the event. Suppose that Burge means the latter. Suppose as well that
we perceive events, and that it is true that perceptual tracking of objects involves anticipations
about the maintenance of their spatial boundaries. If we indeed expect objects to retain their
boundaries in normal cases of object perception, it seems we would just as well expect this when
perceiving any events that have objects as participants. That is, for instance, when perceiving a
person doing jumping jacks, we expect their body to maintain its rigidity and cohesiveness; we
would be surprised if it turned into a liquid or disintegrated. Furthermore, this expectation seems
important for tracking the event of the person doing jumping jacks over time. If, after a few
12

jumping jacks, the person’s body turned into a liquid or disintegrated, we would likely
perceptually register that the event of the person doing jumping jacks has ended. There is, after
all, no person doing jumping jacks any longer, and this is salient. It is plausible, then, that
perceptually tracking events does involve expectations that the objects that participate in the
events will retain their spatial boundaries over time.
But suppose instead that Burge means that perceptual tracking of events does not involve the
expectation that the event’s spatial boundaries will remain the same. A plausible first pass as to
what the perceived spatial boundaries of events are is that they are just the perceived spatial
boundaries of the objects participating in the event. This means that the event of the person
doing jumping jacks has precisely the perceived spatial boundaries of the person’s body. If this is
so, then our expecting the event’s spatial boundaries to remain the same seems important for our
tracking the event. If the person’s body turns to liquid, then the event’s spatial boundaries have
suddenly changed, in a surprising way. We plausibly would not have expected the event to
suddenly change its spatial boundaries in such a dramatic way, and we plausibly would cease to
reidentify the event of the person doing jumping jacks. So, under a prima facie plausible view of
what the perceived spatial boundaries of an event are, it seems that our anticipating those
boundaries to remain the same over time is important for our reidentifying the event.
Under two natural interpretations of the claim that perceptually tracking events does not
involve anticipating the maintenance of spatial boundaries, then, we have reason to think the
claim is false. This is not to say that the claim is not true under other legitimate interpretations,
but that there is room to clarify how, exactly, event perception relates to object perception.
Similarly, there are several phenomena that philosophers discuss or take for granted, whose
relations to event perception have yet to be explored in depth. Perception of causation and
perception of action, which are more controversial phenomena, seem like natural candidates for
13

event perception. Insofar as causation is a relation between events, it is plausible that every
instance of perception of causation is an instance of event perception. And insofar as all actions
are events, it is plausible that every instance of perception of action is also an instance of event
perception.
Perception of motion, perception of change, and even simply perception of objects, which are
less controversial phenomena, are also candidates for event perception. Any instance of an object
moving from one place to another is either itself an event or is part of a larger event, so
perceiving motion might always involve perceiving some event. Any instance of an object
changing its properties may also be an event itself or a part of a larger event, in which case any
instance of perception of change may be an instance of event perception. Depending on the
metaphysics of objects and events, object perception might itself require, or be a form of, event
perception. For instance, if the mere persistence of an object across time is an event, then every
instance of perceiving an object across time may be an instance of event perception. Or, if events
are identical to instantiations of properties by objects at a time (Kim 1976), then whenever we
perceive an object (which always involves our perceptually attributing properties to the object),
we may be perceiving some event.
Event perception may be much more prevalent than philosophers have recognized. Given
that the dominant view in the philosophy of perception is that we perceive objects and properties,
if event perception is just as prevalent as object perception, then event perception is a topic that
demands careful attention. Even more so, if object perception is itself a form of event perception,
rather than vice versa. In any case, the mere fact that it is plausible that perception of motion,
change, and objects are always or often instances of event perception is pressing reason to
investigate event perception further.
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Discovering the relations between event perception and other perceptual phenomena that
philosophers are interested in would, then, be valuable. Even if it turns out that event perception
never occurs, but that some of these phenomena always or sometimes rely on, or are just a form
of, event perception, these phenomena may not be as prevalent as we have thought. Or, if event
perception underlies all object perception, then we had best figure out whether all object
perception reduces to event perception, for talk of object perception in philosophy may have to
be recast in terms of event perception. In any case, it would be informative to discover the
conditions of existence for event perception, the general differences between event perception
and other perceptual phenomena, and whether any of the other phenomena reduce to event
perception or vice versa. These issues have yet to be explored.

1.3 Investigating Event Perception
There is, then, room to improve upon the existing philosophical talk about event perception.
Engaging with objections that threaten event perception (even without threatening object and
property perception) would help clarify what is distinctive to event perception and what it would
take to perceive events in addition to objects and properties. Arguing for or against event
perception across the senses would go beyond the existing work on auditory event perception and
illuminate the relationship between event perception and object perception in a given modality.
Discovering which particular discriminatory capacities we have with respect to events would help
clarify what is distinctive to event perception and how extensive and fine-tuned event perception
is. Incorporating the empirical literature on event perception would provide evidence for or
against various potential views about whether we perceive events, what event perception
involves, how we perceptually represent events, and the like. Clarifying the intended meaning
and domain of ‘event perception’ would provide a foundation for pursuing the topic in a directed
15

fashion. Discovering the relationship between event perception and object perception would help
clarify what is distinctive to event perception and whether event perception is, e.g., more
fundamental than object perception. Discovering the relationships between event perception and
perception of causation, action, motion, change, and the persistence of objects would clarify the
extent of event perception and may provide (additional) conditions of existence for these various
phenomena.
Two goals can form the backbone of a more intentional, careful investigation of event
perception. The primary goal would be to discover whether we perceive events. Relevant issues
would include whether we discriminate events (from certain other items), which events in the
world are candidates for event perception and which are not, which perceptual phenomena are
candidates for event perception and which are not, and what distinguishes events from objects
and properties. The secondary goal would be to discover the relations between event perception
and other perceptual phenomena, such as object perception, motion perception, perception of
causation, etc. Relevant issues would include how we perceptually represent events, how we
perceptually represent objects (or various other items), and whether perceptual representations of
events reduce to perceptual representations of objects (or various other items) or vice versa.
A set of methods would help to achieve these goals. First, an investigation of event perception
ought to make use of the empirical literature on event perception. Because it has information that
will help philosophers answer questions about event perception, it ought to be used to both
constrain and guide the philosophical conversation. Second, an investigation of event perception,
if it is to go beyond the existing work on auditory event perception, should approach event
perception in either a sense-by-sense manner (tailoring arguments for or against event perception
for each sense) or a sense-neutral manner (abstracting from the particularities of any sense that is
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a candidate for event perception and arguing for or against event perception in a way that
applies to all of those senses).
An investigation that is geared at discovering whether we perceive events and what the
relationships are between event perception and other perceptual phenomena, and that makes use
of the empirical literature and addresses event perception across the senses, will improve upon
the current philosophical talk about event perception. It will be more fruitful and directed than
making occasional claims about event perception here and there, and it will respect what is
distinctive to event perception. It will also make progress on the overall philosophical project of
discovering what types of items we perceptually represent and what the relations between those
items are. For these reasons, such an investigation ought to be undertaken.
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2 Perceiving Events

It seems that we perceive events through vision (such as seeing the rain fall), audition (hearing a
song), touch (feeling a massage), and multisensory perception (perceiving a baseball game).
Indeed, philosophers have argued extensively that we perceive events through audition (e.g.,
O’Callaghan 2007), have claimed generically that we perceive events (Burge 2010; Schellenberg
2018, 2016; Soteriou 2010), and have suggested that we perceive events through senses other
than just audition (Burge 2010; Schellenberg 2018). Furthermore, psychologists have gathered
evidence which suggests that we perceive events frequently through vision, audition, and
multisensory perception (e.g., Zacks et al. 2007).
But there are reasons to doubt that we perceive events. First, in the philosophy of perception,
we currently only have prima facie reason to think that we perceive events through senses other
than just audition. This is because the only thorough arguments for event perception have been
offered specifically with respect to auditory event perception, and they are premised on the claim
that audition is not sensitive to the internal spatial structure of objects, unlike, e.g., vision. There
is a standing question, then, whether we perceive events in modalities through which we perceive
objects and their spatial organization (which, I’ll assume, include at least vision, touch, and
multisensory perception). To claim justifiably that we perceive events in modalities other than
just audition – or that we perceive events, without relativizing that claim to audition alone –, new
arguments are needed.
Second, there are reasons to deny the possibility of event perception, regardless of modality.
For instance, suppose events are not a fundamental metaphysical kind (e.g., Kim 1976; Lewis
20

1986; Horgan 1978), but objects and properties are. In this case, we may not be able to
perceptually discriminate events from objects and properties, since we are never presented with
any (fundamental) events in the world, as opposed to (fundamental) objects and properties. Event
perception might itself be a form of object and property perception, since all events would just be
sets of objects and properties in the world. Another concern about event perception is that we
cannot perceive events in full, but merely temporal parts of them. Given that an event takes time
to unfold, at any moment, it has temporal parts that have already passed and/or have yet to take
place. It seems we cannot perceive the past nor the future, so it seems we can at most perceive
temporal parts of events. In order to claim justifiably that we perceive events, these objections
must be contended with.
I will give an argument for event perception that addresses these doubts. I will approach
event perception sense-neutrally, such that what I say is intended to apply to any modalities
through which we might perceive events. I will also make use of the empirical work on event
perception, which has not yet been incorporated into the philosophical talk of event perception.

2.1 The Phenomenon
A good anchor for a philosophical discussion of event perception is the phenomenon that
psychologists call ‘event perception’ (e.g., Zacks et al. 2007; Richmond and Zacks 2017; Zacks,
Tversky, and Iyer 2001). This is perception of such things as people doing the dishes, exercising,
or watering plants; thunderstorms, leaves falling off of trees, or birds flying; songs playing, movies
playing, or baseball games taking place. The targets of this perceptual phenomenon are things in
the world that have the canonical features of ordinary events. They typically take time to unfold,
they have a beginning and end, they are not too long nor short temporally to be observed
casually (i.e., without special equipment), they are not too big nor small spatially to be observed
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casually, they have objects and/or properties as participants, and they involve noticeable changes
across time.
There are two major benefits of focusing on what psychologists call ‘event perception’. The
first is that it matches what is likely the intuitive conception of ‘event perception’, since the
relevant ‘events’ are simply the things in the world with the canonical features of ordinary events.
The second is that there is plenty of empirical work on precisely this phenomenon, so further
theoretical work on event perception can be guided by empirical evidence. Henceforth, ‘event
perception’ will refer to the phenomenon that psychologists have labeled ‘event perception’.
The events that are the target of event perception are different entities than the objects that
are the target of what psychologists often call ‘object perception’ (e.g., Spelke 1990; Peterson
2001). ‘Object perception’ refers to perception of things in the world that have the canonical
features of ordinary objects. They are typically three-dimensional, they are spatially bound, they
bear properties, they aren’t too big nor small to be observed casually. Cups, cats, trees, pencils,
cars, and so on count as objects.
Objects are sometimes characterized as differing from events in that they do not appear to
take time to unfold (e.g., O’Callaghan 2008; O’Callaghan 2011a). Objects seem to be fully
present at any moment, while it seems only a part of an event can be fully present at any
moment. Also unlike events, objects do not have a beginning and end that we typically observe.
While any object comes into being and ceases to be at certain points in time, we usually do not
observe these moments, while we frequently do observe the moments at which an event begins
and ends. This is because many of the events we observe have shorter lifespans than most of the
objects we observe.
Both events and objects differ from the targets of what might be called ‘property perception’,
which is perception of the properties that individuals (like objects or events) bear. Perceptible
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properties include size, shape, color, texture, pitch, temperature, and so on. Psychologists tend to
refer to what I’m calling ‘properties’ as ‘features’ (e.g., Treisman 1998), but I reserve ‘features’ for
any type of item that an individual can bear (which, as we will see, can be other individuals).
Unlike objects and events, properties are not feature-bearing individuals; properties do not bear
other properties. Properties are instead (at least some of) the features that are bound to
individuals.
With our initial characterization of event perception, we can distinguish event perception
from certain phenomena that it might be confused with. First, perceiving an event is different
from the mere event of perceiving, or the mere having of a perceptual episode. A perceptual
episode is itself an event. It begins at some point in time, takes time to occur, and ends at some
other point. But we can undergo the event of perceiving without perceiving any event in the
world. For example, we may have a perceptual experience of ‘a brown book’ from t1 to t2.
Although this perceptual episode is itself an event, we perceived no event during the episode. ‘A
brown book’, in an arbitrary timeframe, is not a thing in the world with the canonical features of
ordinary events. It does not begin, unfold, and end.
Second, perceiving an event is different from sensing the ‘passing of time’. We might judge
that time has passed even if we perceived no event. If we perceive ‘a brown book’ for an
extended period of time, we might be able to tell that we had perceived it for five seconds, or a
minute, etc. But we have perceived no event. We have merely made a judgment about the
duration of our experience or of something in the world.
Third, perceiving an event is different from mere ‘temporal perception’ or ‘temporal
consciousness’ (James 1886; Gibson 1975; Chuard 2011; Dainton 2008). Temporal perception or
consciousness involves experiencing one thing as following another in time, or experiencing a
thing as lasting across time, or experiencing a thing as changing over time, etc. An instance of
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temporal perception or consciousness need not involve perception of any event in the world. It
may consist in no perceptual experience at all (such as experiencing one thought as following
another), or in a perceptual experience of unchanging objects with temporal properties (such as a
duration).
Fourth, perceiving an event is different from having a mere series of perceptual episodes.
Many philosophers have recognized similar points (see Hoerl 2013). We might perceive ‘a brown
book’, then turn our head and perceive ‘an open window’, then turn our head and perceive ‘a
bare wall’. But ‘a brown book, then an open window, then a bare wall’ is not an event in the
world. Even if we wanted to individuate perceptual episodes such that they could include
representations of different objects and properties across time, this would not be identical to
event perception. Perceiving one object after another is not in itself perceiving an event.
An investigation of event perception will be faulty if it fails to appreciate the differences
between event perception and the event of perceiving, the sense of the passing of time, temporal
perception or consciousness, and having a series of perceptual episodes.
The question of this chapter is whether we perceive events. Surely, if we do, we can perceive
only events that fall within a certain range. Some ordinary events, like the season of winter, a
presidential election, the ripening of a bunch of bananas, and an act of vengeance, are too long,
too abstract, too slow-paced, or too social for us to perceive (at least, to perceive in full, or as such)
(see, e.g., Gibson 2015, pp. 6-7). Perception of an event would have to be more direct or
immediate. The same goes, of course, for object and property perception. We cannot perceive
(fully, or as such) objects like the Pacific Ocean, the government, or a betrayed friend, nor
properties like weighing exactly 355 grams, being built in 1900, or being existential. There are
limits to our perceptual capacities. One challenge for an investigation of event perception (or
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object or property perception), then, is to determine where the line falls between the ordinary
events (or objects or properties) that we can and cannot perceive.
Just as well, our initial characterization of event perception will get us only so far in an
investigation of event perception. There are bound to be tricky cases where it is not clear whether
or not they count as event perception, perhaps because their targets are not obviously items in
the world with the canonical features of ordinary events, or perhaps because they are not
obviously perceptual (rather than cognitive) phenomena. Additional theoretical work will be
essential for dealing with such cases.

2.2 Perceiving Events
To perceive events, we must have a type of perceptual representation that is differentially
sensitive to events (rather than mere objects or properties) and tracks events across time. That is,
the representation would have to be tokened frequently by events and tokened infrequently by
mere objects or properties (i.e., objects or properties not participating in any event), and the
representation would have to be updated as the events change. Such a representation would
respond to events either as though they are individuals, or as though they are properties. If, for
instance, our perceptual system treats the event of a conversation between two people as an
individual, it treats the conversation itself as a unit that bears perceptible features, namely, the
objects (the people) and properties (their shapes and so on) that participate in the conversation. If
our perceptual system instead treats the conversation as a property (like ‘is conversing’), then it
treats it as the sort of thing that some individual (like the group of people) bears.
I will argue that we perceive events and that our event representations construe events as
individuals. Both intuitive and empirical evidence supports these claims.
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A perceptual representation as of an individual (like an object) is a perceptual representation
as of a discrete feature-bearing unit (see O’Callaghan 2016, Clark 2004, and Cohen 2004 for
similar characterizations). Several factors are indicative of our perceptual system treating some
type of item in the world as an individual. One factor is attributing perceptible features to the
item (Clark 2000). An object, for instance, is perceptually represented as having a certain color,
shape, size, and so on at any moment.
Another factor is treating the item as persisting across time, despite certain perceptible
changes (Cohen 2004). These changes may be due to changes in the item itself, such as our
perceiving a lightbulb as persisting even as it changes from being off to being on (thus changing
its brightness, color, etc.). These changes may instead be due to changes in the environment in
which we are perceiving the item, such as our perceiving a tree as persisting even as a wind
causes its leaves to rustle. These changes may also be the result of changes in ourselves with
respect to the item, such as our perceiving a couch as persisting even if we close our eyes for a few
seconds; despite the couch temporarily ‘disappearing’ from us, our perceptual system treats the
couch-before-closed-eyes as the same item as the couch-after-closed-eyes.
Yet another factor is discriminating the item from other individuals or properties in a scene
(Siegel 2006; Batty 2011; O’Callaghan 2016). This is a matter of demarcating the boundaries of
the item from the rest of the scene. We see, for instance, that an apple is different from the table
it sits on, the wall behind it, and so on. We attribute boundaries to the apple which mark where
the apple’s own perceptible properties lie, as opposed to the properties of everything else in the
scene.
A final factor is individuating multiple tokens of the same type of item at a time (O’Callaghan
2016). We can, for instance, discriminate the many objects that are presented to us
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simultaneously in a scene. Our perceptual system does not mush together all items of a given type
in a scene, but often represents them as being distinct from each other.
As such, if our perceptual system attributes perceptible features to an item, treats the item as
persisting across time, discriminates the item from the rest of a scene, and individuates multiple
tokens of that type of item at a time, then our perceptual system treats that item as an individual.
The joint satisfaction of these factors establishes that the item is treated as a discrete featurebearing unit.
Our perceptual system engages in all of these behaviors with respect to events. There is
intuitive evidence for this being so. First, we can discriminate an event from the rest of a scene.
We can perceive, for instance, that the playing of a movie in a living room includes the TV, the
images it depicts, and the sounds it makes, but it does not include a nearby floor lamp and its
properties, nor an artwork on the wall and its properties. We recognize that many objects and
properties in the scene are not features of the playing of the movie, even though they are
presented to us simultaneously.
Second, we attribute features to an event. Not only can we tell that the playing of the movie is
different than the floor lamp and its properties, but we furthermore treat the playing of the movie
as having a certain set of objects and properties as participants (again, the TV, its images, its
sounds, etc.) at any time. We do not attribute the features of the movie playing to the floor lamp.
Third, we treat an event as persisting over time. Despite the many changes of features that
the playing of the movie undergoes, we can tell that it is still the same playing of the movie. Just
as well, if we briefly leave, then re-enter, the room, we can tell that the same playing of the movie
as before is taking place. We recognize that events persist across time, even when they change
many of their features.
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Fourth, we individuate multiple simultaneous events. We can tell that the playing of the
movie is distinct from a simultaneous conversation between people in the room, or the blowing of
a fan in the room, or the playing of another movie on a nearby laptop. We usually do not get
confused about which features belong to which events.
Thus, intuitive evidence suggests that we indeed perceive events and that our perceptual
system treats events as individuals. Empirical evidence supports these claims as well. Specifically,
the psychology of event perception suggests that we have a certain type of perceptual
representation (or, more neutrally, psychological state), which can be characterized functionally.
I will argue that when we are presented with an event (one that falls within the to-be-determined
range of perceptible events), we usually token this state, which produces a typical set of
behavioral, neural, and psychological effects. These effects show that (among other things) we
perceptually treat events as individuals.
The typical experiment on event perception presents subjects with a movie, usually depicting
people engaged in everyday activities, like washing the dishes or making the bed. In some
experiments, subjects are asked to press a button when they feel that one event has ended and
another has begun (e.g., Newtson 1973; Zacks et al. 2006). In other experiments, subjects watch
the movies passively, perhaps while their brains are being scanned (e.g., Magliano and Zacks
2011). After viewing a movie, subjects might complete a memory task about what they just
watched (e.g., Swallow et al. 2009).
These experiments have shown that we are sensitive to the beginnings and ends of the
successive events that we are presented with. Some of the evidence is behavioral. When subjects
are asked to press a button when they feel one meaningful unit of activity has ended and another
has begun (henceforth the ‘segmentation task’), they do so reliably, both intra- and
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intersubjectively (Zacks et al. 2007). This remains true even when subjects segment the same
movies over a year apart (Speer et al. 2003).
The reliability of the results of the segmentation task is reason to think that subjects are
indeed responding to the boundaries between successive events – that is, to the points at which
the items in the world with the canonical features of ordinary events begin and end. Because the
events that are relevant to event perception are just ordinary events, we would expect a good
amount of consensus as to where subjects parse events in an ongoing scene, and that is what we
find. The fact that subjects are in many cases asked to pick out the beginnings and ends of
‘meaningful units of activity’, rather than events per se, is not particularly problematic. Because
the subjects are watching movies, the ordinary events that are depicted in the movies just are the
meaningful units of activity in the movies. That is especially clear in the movies depicting people
engaged in ordinary activities.
There is further reason for thinking that in the segmentation task, subjects are indeed
responding to the boundaries between successive events. It turns out that the points that subjects
mark as event boundaries in a movie correspond, to varying degrees, with movements of objects,
spatial or temporal discontinuities in the scene, changes in people’s interactions with objects (such
as picking an object up), changes in the number of people present, changes in people’s
interactions with each other (such as beginning a conversation), and changes in people’s goals
(such as beginning a new goal-directed activity) in the movie (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds 2009;
Zacks 2004; Zacks et al. 2006; Magliano et al. 2001). Furthermore, the greater number of these
changes in features that occur simultaneously, the more likely subjects are to mark that point as
an event boundary (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds 2009). In addition, neural responses to changes
in these features account for a portion of the neural responses to event boundaries, suggesting
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that neural responses to event boundaries are mediated by registering changes in these features
(Zacks et al. 2010).
These are precisely the sorts of features we would expect subjects to be responsive to when
marking the boundaries between successive events in movies. Changes in the objects and
properties that participate in an event are indeed relevant to changes in the event, and salient,
simultaneous changes in a number of those objects and properties tend to mark a beginning or
end of an event in the world.
There is neural evidence for our sensitivity to the boundaries between successive events as
well. The points that subjects mark as event boundaries in the segmentation task significantly
align with transient responses in various neural regions. Zacks, Braver, et al. (2001) recorded
subjects’ fMRI data as they watched movies passively, without completing any task. Next, the
subjects’ fMRI data were again recorded as they watched the same movies while doing the
segmentation task. It turned out that the points that subjects identified as event boundaries
significantly aligned with the transient neural responses (particularly, in the posterior cortex and
the right frontal cortex) that occurred during both the active and passive viewings.
Zacks et al. (2010), Zacks et al. (2006), and Speer et al. (2003) found the same results with
respect to a number of other neural regions. In the first session of the Speer et al. study, subjects
watched movies passively, then watched the same movies while doing the segmentation task.
Subjects’ fMRI data were recorded during both the passive and active viewings. This was then
repeated in a second session, which occurred over a year after the first session. The event
boundaries that the subjects identified during the first session significantly aligned not only with
the transient neural responses in the first session (during both passive and active viewings), but
also with the transient neural responses in the second session (during both passive and active
viewings). That is to say that there were selective neural responses during passively-viewed
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movies which significantly aligned with the points that subjects had identified as event boundaries
over a year earlier.
The results from the fMRI studies give further reason to think that we are sensitive to the
boundaries between successive events. Not only do we reliably mark off the boundaries between
successive events when asked, but our brains respond transiently to these boundaries naturally
(that is, even when we are not asked to do any task).
There is also psychological evidence for our sensitivity to the boundaries between successive
events. Various studies have shown that the beginnings and ends of events, as opposed to the
insides of events (i.e., what happens between the beginning and end of any event), are
psychologically significant. Newtson and Engquist (1976) showed subjects portions of movies.
The subjects were then shown frames that came from either the portion of the movie that they
just watched, or from the portion that they hadn’t watched. For each frame, subjects were asked
to identify whether or not it came from the portion of the movie they watched. It turned out that
subjects were significantly better at accurately judging whether or not the frame came from the
portion of the movie they watched if the frame came from a point that had been identified as an
event boundary (by a different set of subjects who did the segmentation task). If, instead, the frame
did not come from a point that had been identified as an event boundary – so, it depicted the inside
of some event –, subjects were significantly worse at accurately judging whether or not that frame
came from the portion of the movie they had just watched. The subjects, then, were better at
recognizing event boundaries from the movies than non-boundaries.
A similar effect was found by Swallow et al. (2009). They showed subjects movies that were
regularly interrupted by recognition tasks. Most of the recognition tasks asked subjects to identify
which object on the screen (out of two) appeared in the portion of the movie they just watched.
Each time, an object that actually appeared in the movie five seconds before the recognition task
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began, and an object of a different type that did not appear in the latest portion of the movie,
were displayed. The result was that subjects were significantly better at recognizing the objects
that were present during an event boundary in the latest portion of the movie, as opposed to the
objects that were present during no event boundary (i.e., only in the inside of some event) in the
latest portion of the movie. The event boundaries had been identified by a different group of
subjects. So, objects are more likely to be recognized if they are present during the beginning or
end of an event, instead of present merely within some event.
Similarly, Boltz (1992) showed subjects movies that were occasionally interrupted by
commercials. For each movie, all of the commercials occurred either at event boundaries or at
non-boundaries in the movie. The event boundaries had been identified by a different group of
subjects. Afterward, the subjects completed three tasks. One was a recall task, in which they were
asked to describe the major events that happened in the movie. One was a recognition task, in
which they were shown short clips that were either from the movie they watched, or from a
movie they hadn’t watched but that had some of the same characters and settings. They were
asked to identify which clips came from the movie they watched. The final task was a temporal
order task. They were shown two short clips that came from the movie, and were asked to
identify which came first in the movie. All three tasks revealed a significant effect of commercial
location. Specifically, subjects did significantly better on each of the tasks for the movies in which
the commercials occurred during event boundaries, than for the movies in which the
commercials occurred during non-boundaries.
The results of these studies give further support for our sensitivity to the boundaries between
successive events. They show that we are psychologically sensitive to the difference between the
beginnings and ends, as opposed to the insides, of the events that we are presented with. In
general, our memory of the beginnings and ends of events is better than our memory of the
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insides of events, and our memory of large events (like full movies) is better if interruptions occur
at the beginnings and ends, rather than at the insides, of constituent events.
The empirical evidence, then, shows that we are behaviorally, neurally, and psychologically
sensitive to the beginnings and ends of events. We can tell when an event has begun or ended,
and we can tell when two successive events are different from each other. This is to say that we
can discriminate events from the rest of an ongoing scene temporally (since we register the
temporal boundaries of the events that occur in a scene), and that we can discriminate successive
events.
A plausible interpretation of our behavioral, neural, and psychological sensitivity to event
boundaries is just that we are perceptually sensitive to these boundaries, and we are perceptually
sensitive to them because we perceive events (and being sensitive to events’ boundaries is part of
perceiving events). The behavioral, neural, and psychological responses may very well be effects
or constituents of our perceiving events.
Importantly, the evidence presented thus far does not warrant this conclusion on its own. The
fact that we are behaviorally, neurally, and psychologically sensitive to event boundaries does not
necessarily mean that our perceptual system treats events as individuals. It is possible that our
sensitivity to event boundaries is due simply to our ability to perceptually register salient changes
in a scene, and event boundaries tend to be points of salient change. As long as we have a ‘salient
change detector’, we probably can respond reliably to the boundaries between successive events
behaviorally, neurally, and psychologically. We need not treat that which happens between any
pair of salient changes as a unit in its own right that begins and ends when those salient changes
occur.
This being so, to establish that we treat events as individuals, we need further evidence that
shows that the criteria for individualhood are met. Granting that we discriminate events from the
33

rest of a scene temporally and that we discriminate successive events, it must still be shown that
we treat events as persisting, attribute features to events, and discriminate multiple simultaneous
events. If these criteria are met, it would mean that we treat a given event as a unit, which
packages up certain objects and properties in a scene, but not others. It would establish that our
sensitivity to event boundaries is not simply a matter of salient change detection, but of actual
event perception.
Various studies suggest that we treat events as persisting across time. This has been
demonstrated in experiments on the relationship between event boundaries and cuts in movies.
Cuts are changes in the viewer’s perspective relative to the environment depicted in the movie.
For instance, the front of a person may be shown, then after a cut, their back may be shown, or
the front of the person they are talking to. Even though cuts are fairly salient changes in movies –
they sometimes present us with a brand new set of objects and properties in a given scene –, it
turns out that the occurrence of a cut does not suffice for subjects to mark a boundary between
successive events (Schwan et al. 2000; Zacks et al. 2010; Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds 2009).
Schwan et al. had one group of subjects identify the event boundaries in movies. The
experimenters then edited the movies by placing cuts either at some of the identified event
boundaries, or at some non-boundaries. A different set of subjects then did the segmentation task
on the edited movies. Whether the cuts had occurred during event boundaries or non-boundaries
in the movies had no effect on the number of event boundaries the subjects marked, and the cuts
that occurred at non-boundaries did not make the subjects any more likely to mark an event
boundary. Similarly, Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds (2009) and Zacks et al. (2010) found that cuts
did not themselves result in subjects marking boundaries between successive events.
This means that cuts, despite being fairly salient changes, are not relevant to where we
identify the beginnings and ends of successive events to be. The fact that subjects were not any
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more likely to mark event boundaries at cuts shows that, presumably, they recognized whether
the event before the cut and the event after the cut were identical. If the events were identical,
subjects did not mark an event boundary. This means that subjects were able to treat events as
persisting across time, despite changes in their perspective relative to the events. This is a
hallmark of treating an item as an individual. Not all perceptible changes are taken to mark the
existence of a new, different individual than before.
Further evidence supports the claim that we treat events as persisting. Zacks (2004) showed
subjects an animation of shapes moving constantly and smoothly. Despite the fact that the shapes
were perceptibly changing their locations during the entire animation, the subjects did not mark
a new event boundary upon each slight movement. Instead, they marked event boundaries every
several seconds, even when asked to mark whenever the smallest meaningful event ended and
another began. This suggests that the subjects perceptually grouped a set of features across time
as belonging to a single ongoing event, even though some of those features were changing
constantly across time.
Just as well, as already noted, a set of studies has shown that certain types of changes in
events’ features correspond with the points that subjects mark as event boundaries in movies to
different degrees. Changes in the characters or objects present and the actions done by characters
are most strongly correlated with event boundaries, while changes in the spatiotemporal setting
are least strongly correlated (Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds 2009; Magliano et al. 2001). This is to
say that despite being presented with perceptible changes in features that are relevant to events,
such as the event’s spatiotemporal location, subjects do not always mark the ending of the current
event and the beginning of another, but sometimes treat the current event as persisting.
The evidence, then, shows that we treat events as persisting across time. It is unlikely that our
sensitivity to event boundaries is due simply to our perceptual system registering change in an
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ongoing scene. Many salient perceptible changes occur in a scene – including changes in events
themselves and changes in our perspective relative to events – that do not result in our identifying
event boundaries. We do not take just any perceptible change to mark the end of the current
event and the beginning of another. Instead, we treat events as persisting across time.
But perhaps our segmentation behavior – marking event boundaries reliably, and not with
just any salient change in a scene – can be as it is without our having a rich representation of any
given event. That is, perhaps we are simply able to individuate events well. We can tell successive
events apart from each other. We can tell when one ends and another begins. We don’t treat just
any salient change in a perceptual scene as indicating that a given event has ended, but only
some. We are good at telling which salient changes in a scene are relevant to the beginnings and
ends of events and which are not, so we are good at individuating events.
Individuating events well is more minimal than treating events as individuals. If we treat
events as individuals, there is an important sense in which we bind together certain features in
the scene and register them as a cohesive unit, by attributing that set of features to a particular
event. We need not do this to individuate events well; all we need to do is detect whether enough
of the relevant sorts of changes occur in a scene simultaneously. In order to establish that we treat
events as individuals, and do not merely individuate them well, I still must show that we
positively attribute a discrete set of features in a scene to a given event. This would mean that we
represent each individual event that we detect in a scene with some detail.
We need additional evidence to show that we attribute features to a given event. Various
studies on event completion suggest that we can attribute certain features of an event that we
missed to the event. Strickland and Keil (2011) showed subjects videos of people launching
objects, like kicking a ball or using a slingshot. In some of the videos, the crucial moments of
launching – like the person’s foot making contact with the ball, or the person’s hand letting go of
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the taut slingshot – were omitted. Among the videos with the crucial moments of launching
missing, the first clip (leading up to the crucial moment) was followed by a second clip, which fell
into one of three classes. First, the second clip may have depicted the rest of the scene, which was
causally related to the scene depicted in the first clip. E.g., if the first clip showed someone about
to kick a ball, the second clip would show the ball rolling across the ground. Second, the second
clip may have depicted an irrelevant scene. E.g., the first clip of someone about to kick a ball
might be followed by an unrelated scene of people jogging. Third, the second clip may have
depicted the rest of the scene, but in a jumbled fashion. E.g., the second clip would show the ball
rolling across the ground, but playing in reverse (so the ball comes closer to the kicker over time).
After watching each video (some with the crucial moments of launching, some without),
subjects were shown several images and were asked to identify whether each image came from
the video. An image of the crucial moment of launching was included every time. It turned out
that for the videos with the crucial moments of launching missing, subjects were significantly
more likely to falsely identify the image of the crucial moment as having appeared in the video, if
the second clip had depicted the rest of the scene (which was causally related to what was
depicted in the first clip), than if the second clip had depicted an unrelated scene or a causally
related but jumbled scene. That is, when the first and second clips were causally and temporally
contiguous (apart from missing the crucial moment of launching), subjects were much more likely
to take themselves to have seen the crucial moment, than when the first and second clips were
not causally and temporally contiguous – even though the subjects had in fact not seen the
crucial moment of launching.
Similar results were found by Brockhoff et al. (2016), who showed subjects – soccer novices,
soccer players, and expert soccer referees – videos of soccer games. Each short video included or
excluded the crucial moment of contact between a player and the ball. In the videos excluding
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the crucial moment, the second clip depicted either the rest of the scene or an unrelated scene in
the soccer game. Just as Strickland and Keil had found, subjects were significantly more likely to
falsely indicate that they had seen the (missing) crucial moment of contact if the second clip
depicted the rest of the scene, rather than an unrelated scene. This was so for soccer novices,
players, and expert referees alike. In a second experiment, Brockhoff et al. explicitly asked
subjects whether or not the moment of contact was shown, instead of having them identify
whether particular images were present in the video. The same results were found: subjects were
significantly more likely to say that the moment of contact was shown for the videos in which the
moment of contact was missing but the second clip depicted the rest of the scene, than if the
second clip depicted an unrelated scene.
Papenmeier et al. (2019) used roughly the same experimental design as in Brockhoff et al.’s
second experiment. Under one condition, they asked subjects whether or not the moment of
contact had been shown in the video they watched. Under another condition, though, they asked
subjects to press a button when the moment of contact was shown, as the video was playing.
Surprisingly, even in the latter condition, subjects were significantly more likely to mistakenly mark
the presence of the crucial moment of contact for the videos in which the second clip depicted
the rest of the scene, rather than an unrelated scene. In another experiment, Papenmeier et al.
had subjects do the segmentation task on the videos. They found that subjects were marginally
more likely to mark a boundary between successive events for videos in which the moment of
contact was omitted and the second clip showed an unrelated scene, than if the second clip
showed the rest of the scene.
These studies give strong evidence in support of event completion. When crucial moments of
an event are not shown, subjects are more likely to indicate that they in fact saw those crucial
moments, when the second clip depicts the rest of the scene rather than an unrelated scene. A
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plausible explanation of these results is that in the videos missing the crucial moments but
showing the rest of the scene, subjects are effectively ‘filling in’ the information that they had
missed. Because there was in fact a causal and temporal link between the events depicted in the
first and second clips, subjects attributed the missing link – the crucial moment of contact – to the
event that was depicted. That is, plausibly, they recognized that the event in the first clip and the
event in the second clip were the same event, and that the crucial moment of contact was also
part of the same event (namely, the part that occurred between what was depicted in the first and
second clips).
But in the videos in which the crucial moment of contact was missing and the second clip
depicted an unrelated scene, subjects (plausibly) recognized that the event in the first clip and the
event in the second clip were not the same event. The crucial moment of contact, then, would
not have explained the relationship between what was depicted in the first and second clips; its
presence would not have made the first and second clips causally and temporally contiguous,
since the first and second clips depicted scenes that simply weren’t causally and temporally
contiguous (even if the crucial moment was inserted between them). As a result, subjects were
much more likely to falsely report that they had seen the crucial moment of contact for the videos
in which the second clip showed the rest of the scene, rather than an unrelated scene. They filled
in the missing information when it clearly would have fit the gap between the first and second
clips.
Notice that the phenomenon of event completion is more rich than the phenomenon of
treating an event as persisting across time. It is not merely the case that we recognize that a given
event persists even when certain salient perceptible changes occur, such as changes in the event
itself or in our perspective relative to it. It is furthermore the case that we actually attribute to the
event information that we had missed. That is, when we miss some of the features of an event
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(such as the critical moment of contact), not only can we recognize whether the event has
persisted, but if it has, we can also attribute the features we had missed to the event. We
recognize that the event has a particular set of features that we were not presented with, and we
furthermore are prone to mistakenly take ourselves to have perceived that set of features.
The evidence in favor of event completion, then, points towards our ability to attribute
features to an event. It appears that we can treat an event as having a certain set of features, even
if we are not presented with all of those features. Event completion cannot be accounted for by
our ability to individuate events alone. Even if we respond to the beginnings and ends of
successive events reliably, this is not sufficient for our tendency to mistakenly take ourselves to
have perceived missing features of an event when the second clip depicts the rest of the scene as
opposed to an unrelated scene. While we are presumably recognizing whether or not the event
depicted in the first clip persists through the second clip – which can be accounted for by
individuation –, that is not all that we are doing. We are also filling in missing information. We
are attributing the information we missed to the event in the cases where the event persisted
across the two clips, as indicated by our tendency to err.
Event completion thus gives reason to think that we attribute features to events. If we can
attribute features of an event that we’ve missed to the event, we can likely attribute features of an
event that we didn’t miss to the event. That is, if we can attribute the crucial moment of contact
– the person’s foot touching the ball, e.g. –, which we were not even presented with, to the event
of the person kicking the ball across the field, surely we can also attribute the person running
towards the ball and the ball flying across the field (or, more strictly, the objects and properties
associated with those sub-events), which we were presented with, to the event. The thought, then,
is that as we are presented with an event, we are attributing to it the features of it that we are
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presented with, and sometimes even the features of it that we have missed. We perceptually treat
the event as having a set of features (objects, properties, and/or sub-events).
Thus, there is reason to think that we perceptually attribute features to events. Not only do
we individuate events, but we also ‘identify’ them, in the sense that we treat them as having certain
features. We treat some of the features in a scene as participating in an event, as the event is
unfolding.
But, it’s possible that we perceptually attribute features to the successive events that we
individuate in a scene in a very coarse way. It could be that we attribute literally all of the
perceptible features in a scene to any event that we have individuated. That is, suppose that as
we are looking outside our window, we perceptually register times t1 and t2 as the beginning and
end of a child doing a cartwheel outside. Suppose we did so by responding to the right kinds of
salient changes in the scene (like abrupt changes in the child’s position), so t1 and t2 were in fact
the beginning and end of the child’s cartwheel. Granting that we perceptually attribute features
to the event of the child’s cartwheel – in addition to registering its beginning and end and
treating it as persisting across time – is consistent with our attributing all of the perceptible
features in the scene between t1 and t2 to the event of the child’s cartwheel. For all I’ve shown
thus far, it’s possible that we perceptually attribute all of the cars, buildings, animals, etc. and
their properties that we perceive in the scene to the event of the child’s cartwheel.
Perceptually treating an event as an individual requires our attributing a discrete set of features
in the scene to the event, rather than all of the features in the scene. Ideally, we would carve out
only the objects and properties that are participating in the event, and treat them as features of
the event. In the cartwheel case, we would thus attribute the child and their properties to the
event, but not the nearby cars, buildings, animals, etc. and their properties. If we always attribute
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all of the features in a scene to any event that we discriminate, then ‘perceiving an event’ would
look more like ‘perceiving a scene within a particular timeframe’.
What is needed is evidence that we perceptually attribute only a discrete set of features in a
scene to a given event. Evidence that we can individuate simultaneous but distinct events would
do the trick, since it would show that we treat one event as having a certain set of features in the
scene, and another event as having a different set of features in the scene, within the same timeframe
(or at least in overlapping timeframes).
There is indeed evidence that we individuate simultaneous events. Bregman and
Dannenbring (1973) played subjects two sequences of tones. Each sequence followed either the
pattern ‘H1, L1, H2, L2’ or the pattern ‘H1, L2, H2, L1’, where H is a relatively high pitch and L is
a relatively low pitch, 1 is slightly lower than 2, and the perceived difference between H1 and H2
is the same as that between L1 and L2. The difference between the two patterns, then, is whether
the pitch difference between each H-L pair in the pattern remains the same or varies. In the first
pattern, it remains the same (since the H1-L1 difference is the same as the H2-L2 difference), while
in the second, it varies (since the H1-L2 difference is smaller than the H2-L1 difference). If the
pitch difference remains the same between each H-L pair, then L1 comes before L2 in the
sequence; otherwise, L2 comes before L1.
The experimenters played subjects one sequence, then another, which may or may not have
followed the same pattern. Subjects were asked whether the order of the tones in the two
sequences was the same. Across trials, the amount of time that each tone was presented for varied
(so, sometimes the tones in the sequence proceeded each other quickly), and whether or not a full
or partial glissando connecting the subsequent tones varied (so, sometimes a descending series of
tones was heard between each H-L pair and an ascending series of tones was heard between each
L-H pair).
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Both the variations in time and in the presence of a glissando had a significant effect on
subjects’ performance. Subjects were worse at identifying whether the temporal order of the
tones in the two sequences was the same if there was neither a full nor partial glissando
connecting subsequent tones, or if the tones in the pattern proceeded quickly. Bregman and
Dannenbring suggest that in such cases, subjects were segmenting the high tones into a separate
auditory stream from the low tones. That is, thanks in part to the fact that the high tones were
not connected to the low tones via glissandos, or that the sequences proceeded quickly, the H1-H2
part of the pattern was more likely to be heard as distinct from the L1-L2 part of the pattern. This
would explain the subjects’ worse performance on identifying whether the order of the tones in
the two sequences was the same. Whether the subjects are presented with the ‘H1, L1, H2, L2’
pattern or the ‘H1, L2, H2, L1’ pattern will not make a difference to them, if they are indeed
grouping together the Hs and the Ls into separate streams; they will simply be hearing ‘H1, H2’
and ‘L2, L1’ patterns playing simultaneously. The relative order of the particular H tones and L
tones in the pattern, then, will not be discriminated, so subjects will be worse at identifying
whether the temporal order of the tones in the two sequences is the same.
On the other hand, when each H-L and L-H pair is connected by a full or partial glissando,
or when the tones proceed each other more slowly, subjects are more likely to hear the pattern as
a single auditory stream. They do not break the ‘H1, L1, H2, L2’ pattern, for instance, into
separate ‘H1, H2’ and ‘L1, L2’ patterns, but they hear it as a single pattern in its own right. They
are thus better at identifying the relative order of the H and L tones. When a sequence is heard
as a single auditory stream, the difference between the ‘H1, L1, H2, L2’ pattern and the ‘H1, L2,
H2, L1’ pattern is detected. But when a sequence is heard as two separate auditory streams, the
difference between the patterns is not detected.
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In a second experiment, Bregman and Dannenbring played subjects one sequence and
simply asked them whether it sounded like one or two auditory streams. This verified the
interpretation of the finding from the first experiment. Subjects were much more likely to say that
a sequence sounded like two auditory streams when the tones were not connected by glissandos
or proceeded each other quickly.
This, then, is evidence that we can perceive multiple distinct events simultaneously. Positing
that subjects are breaking a given pattern up into separate ‘H1, H2’ and ‘L1, L2’ streams explains
why they are worse at judging the temporal order of tones when they proceed quickly or are not
connected by glissandos. They are hearing the ‘H1, H2’ stream as distinct from the ‘L1, L2’
stream. It is fair to say, then, that their perceptual system treats the string of Hs as a separate
event from the string of Ls, even though both events are unfolding simultaneously.
Our ability to individuate simultaneous events suggests that we perceptually attribute a discrete
set of features in a scene to a given event. In this case, the subjects were attributing only the high
tones to one event, and only the low tones to a separate event, even though the high tone event
and the low tone event were unfolding in the same scene within the same timeframe. Thus, we
do not perceptually attribute all of the perceptible features in a scene to a single event, but only a
particular set of those features. This is what enables us to discriminate multiple simultaneous
events.
I have argued that our perceptual system engages in behaviors that indicate that it treats
events as individuals: it discriminates events from the rest of a scene, treats events as persisting
across time, attributes features to events, and discriminates simultaneous events. We perceptually
treat an event as a discrete unit in an ongoing perceptual scene that bears a discrete set of features
(objects and properties) in the scene. This is to say, then, that we have perceptual representations
of events, which construe events as individuals. The many behavioral, neural, and psychological
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effects discovered in the empirical research on event perception can be seen as effects or
constituents of these event representations. Tokening an event representation produces those
effects.
Here, then, is the picture I have sketched so far. Say we are presented with an event, like a
person doing the dishes, so we token a perceptual representation of that event. The
representation will construe the event of the person doing the dishes as an individual, that is, as a
discrete unit in the scene with a particular set of features. It is thanks to our perceptually treating
the event of the person doing the dishes as an individual that we can discriminate it from the rest
of a scene temporally (so, we can perceptually register when the person starts and stops doing the
dishes); that we can treat the event of the person doing the dishes as persisting across time (even
though we’ll perceive changes in where the dishes are, which one the person is holding, what the
person’s bodily position is, and so on across time); that we can attribute a set of features to the
event of the person doing the dishes (like the person, the dishes, and their shapes, colors, sizes,
and locations); and that we can discriminate the event of the person doing the dishes from other
events in the scene (like a different person making a sandwich nearby). Our tokening a perceptual
representation of the person doing the dishes produces the behavioral, neural, and psychological
effects that are associated with event perception (like remembering the person starting and
stopping doing the dishes better than washing each dish, showing the transient neural responses
when the person starts and stops doing the dishes, and so on).
But in order for event representations to be properly so-called, it must be the case that they
are differentially sensitive to events, rather than mere objects or properties (that are not
participating in any perceptible event). That is, event representations must be tokened frequently
by events in the world, and must be tokened infrequently by mere objects or properties in the

45

world. This would show that event representations are sensitive to the presence of events, relative
to non-events.
We know from the empirical research that event representations are in fact tokened by events
frequently. When subjects are presented with movies, which are events themselves and consist in
smaller events, they token event representations, as indicated by the behavioral, neural, and
psychological effects shown in the empirical research. Subjects are indeed responding to items in
the world that have the canonical features of events.
As far as we currently have reason to believe, event representations are tokened infrequently
by mere objects or properties. It would be surprising to discover that when presenting subjects
with a set of objects or properties that are not participating in any event (such as an unchanging
image of a cat, or a red splotch), subjects would reliably mark points at which ‘one meaningful
unit of activity has ended and another has begun’, as they do when presented with events in
movies. None of the features indicating a change of events would be presented to them, so there’s
no reason to think that they would segment any events reliably. It would just as well be surprising
to find that the neural and psychological markers of being presented with the beginning and end,
as opposed to the insides, of an event would appear in the subject, given that the images on the
screen would not be unfolding across time in any meaningful way.
It appears, then, that event representations are tokened frequently by events in the world, and
tokened infrequently by mere objects or properties in the world. But for event representations to
be properly so-called, it must also be the case that they track events across time. That is,
frequently, when presented with a new event in the world, we token a new event representation,
and only infrequently, when not presented with a new event in the world (but, instead, an event
that is persisting), we token a new event representation. This would show that token event
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representations are swapped in a way that usually corresponds to actual changes of events in the
world.
Indeed, it seems that event representations track events across time. We know from the
empirical research that, frequently, subjects token a new event representation when presented
with a new event in a movie, since they reliably show the behavioral, neural, and psychological
effects of tokening a new representation at the boundaries between successive events. And, as far
as we have currently reason to believe, subjects infrequently token a new event representation
when not presented with a change of events. This is suggested by the fact that subjects segment
events reliably, and in a way that accords with the sorts of changes in a scene that are in fact
indicative of a change of events.
Because event representations are usually tokened by events in the world, and new event
representations are usually tokened by new events in the world, event representations are
properly so-called. We perceive events, thanks to our event representations.
Several factors point towards event representations indeed being perceptual, rather than
cognitive. As already discussed, our perceptual systems appear to segment events ‘naturally’, or
unprompted. While watching movies, subjects’ brains showed reliable transient responses at the
points that the subjects would later identify as event boundaries. That is, the transient neural
responses that occurred while subjects watched movies passively (that is, without being instructed
to complete any task) corresponded to the points that subjects afterward marked as event
boundaries in those movies during the segmentation task (Zacks et al. 2001; Zacks et al. 2010;
Zacks et al. 2006; Speer et al. 2003).
The behavioral evidence gathered in the segmentation task is susceptible to the objection that
subjects are simply judging, post-perceptually, that a given event has ended and another has
begun. They can do so reliably even if they don’t actually perceive events. The psychological
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evidence gathered in memory tasks is susceptible to the objection that subjects are simply judging
or (mis)remembering that they had perceived events, and here too, the psychological effects may
be reliable even if subjects didn’t actually perceive any events. The neural evidence is less
susceptible to these objections. This is because the transient neural responses occur live, while
subjects are watching movies; they likely are not simply a matter of subjects remembering the events
in the movies. They also occur unprompted, while subjects are simply watching movies passively,
and even when subjects are not aware that event perception is being studied; they likely are not
just a matter of subjects judging that certain events have occurred. The neural evidence is thus a
good indication that we indeed perceive events as a scene unfolds.
There is further evidence that event representations are perceptual, not merely cognitive.
Ten- to eleven-month-old infants appear to segment perceptual scenes into discrete events.
Baldwin et al. (2001) showed infants a short movie of people engaging in an everyday activity,
until the infants were familiarized with it. The infants were then shown a version of the movie
that included a brief pause. The pause occurred either at an event boundary (e.g., the person
grasps a towel, just before putting it on a towel rack) or during the inside of some event (e.g., the
person is moving their arm towards a towel to grasp it). The result was that the infants looked at
the ‘interrupted’ (latter) version of the movie significantly longer than both the version that they
had become familiar with and the ‘completed’ (former) version of the movie.
The infants, then, behaved as though they found a pause during the inside of an event more
novel than a pause at the end of an event in the movie. This suggests that, like adults, infants can
discriminate the beginnings and ends of events. They can tell when an event has begun or ended,
and when an event is still unfolding. The fact that infants appear to parse an ongoing scene into
discrete events ought to be treated similarly to the evidence for infants parsing a scene into

48

discrete objects; it should be taken to point towards this behavior being perceptual (see, e.g., Burge
2010, pp. 300-312; Quilty-Dunn 2020; Green 2019).
Another piece of evidence suggests that our sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of events is
indeed perceptual. The better a subject’s ‘segmentation ability’ – that is, the more the points that
they mark as event boundaries during the segmentation task align with the points marked by
other subjects in the sample –, the better their memory of the movie they had watched (Kurby
and Zacks 2018). Sargent et al. (2013) discovered that this relationship is not accounted for by
general cognitive capacities, such as working memory, executive function, episodic memory, and
general knowledge. Instead, it is uniquely accounted for by segmentation ability itself. That is, it
appears that the reason that subjects with better segmentation ability remember movies better is
due simply to the fact that those subjects have better segmentation ability, and not because they’re
better at remembering in general, or that they know more about the world in general. This
suggests that segmentation ability is a wholly perceptual capacity.
For these reasons, event perception is indeed a perceptual activity. This is not to say that
cognitive factors cannot play a role in event perception. When observing human activities, the
goals and activity types play into how we individuate those events. It is likely that information
about goals and activity types is represented cognitively, rather than perceptually, so it is likely
that cognition influences our individuation of events. Saying that event perception is genuinely
perceptual is also not to say that we do not engage in event cognition, wherein we use cognitive
representations of events. We most likely do; we seem to be able to think about, analyze, make
judgments about, and make inferences on the basis of events. Where exactly the line falls
between event perception and event cognition (or, just as well, perceptual vs. cognitive
representations of events) will be partly an empirical matter.
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The fact that we have event representations does not imply we always represent events
accurately. It is only in veridical cases of event perception that we in fact token an event
representation when presented with an event, and update it when the event we’re presented with
changes. In non-veridical cases, we might token an event representation when we are not
presented with an event (but instead, say, a set of unchanging objects and properties), or token a
new representation even when we’re not presented with a new event. To figure out what exactly
goes wrong in non-veridical cases, we would need to determine what the accuracy conditions are
for event representations.
Importantly, to say that we perceive events (or that we have perceptual representations of
events) is not to say that event perception is irreducible (or that our event representations are
irreducible to our object and property representations). All I’ve argued is that we have a unique
type of perceptual representation, one that is differentially sensitive to events, rather than mere
objects or properties. It is a live possibility that token event representations are nothing more
than certain combinations of token object and property representations. For instance, suppose we
have an event representation of a person dancing. It is possible that our event representation is
nothing over and above a set of token object and property representations that collectively pick
out the event of the person dancing in the world – namely, our representations of the person
(object) and their shape, size, bodily positions, and so on (properties) across time. Because every
event we perceive has at least some objects or properties as participants, it is possible that any
token event representation consists in nothing but the set of object and property representations
that track those particular objects and properties across time. So, while we can legitimately talk
about event representations – because our perceptual system does discriminate events from nonevents and track events across time –, those representations might be token-identical to object
and property representations.
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2.3 The Possibility of Event Perception
I have argued that we perceive events. Yet there are reasons to deny the possibility of event
perception. Suppose, for instance, that events are not a fundamental metaphysical kind (e.g.,
Kim 1976; Lewis 1986; Horgan 1978). Suppose that the only fundamental metaphysical kinds
are objects and properties. One might think that, in this case, we cannot be differentially sensitive
to events as opposed to objects and properties, since there are no fundamental events, in addition to
fundamental objects and properties, in the world. Differential sensitivity to some kind of item in
the world requires it to be a fundamental metaphysical kind, because the fundamental
metaphysical kinds just are the kinds of item in the world that we are presented with. Insofar as
differential sensitivity to events, as opposed to objects and properties, is required for perception of
events, we cannot perceive events, the thought goes.
I maintain, however, that we are differentially sensitive to ordinary events, as opposed to
ordinary objects and properties. This is so even if ordinary events do not count as a fundamental
metaphysical kind themselves, or even if they do not consist in fundamental events (as opposed to
fundamental objects and properties). As the empirical work on event perception suggests, we
have a unique type of perceptual representation that is differentially sensitive to things in the
world with the canonical features of ordinary events (beginning and ending, unfolding over time,
having objects and properties as participants, etc.). There are indeed things in the world that
have the canonical features of ordinary events. Our perceptual system treats those things as
certain type of individual, and it treats that type of individual differently than it treats ordinary
objects and properties.
Whether or not there is a fundamental metaphysical kind ‘ordinary event’ does not make a
difference to how our perceptual system carves up types of items in the world. Our perceptual
system probably categorizes items in a way that is useful to us as biological creatures, rather than
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in a way that reflects fundamental metaphysical truths. Just as well, even if there is no
fundamental metaphysical kind ‘event’ that all ordinary events reduce to, our perceptual system
nevertheless treats ordinary events differently than it treats ordinary objects and properties.
Because we are differentially sensitive to ordinary events, as opposed ordinary objects and
properties, we perceive ordinary events.
But there is another worry about event perception stemming from the metaphysical status of
ordinary events. Suppose again that the only fundamental metaphysical kinds are objects and
properties. One might grant that perception of ordinary events occurs (since it does not require
there to be any fundamental events), yet deny that event perception is interestingly different than
object and property perception. If ordinary events are sets of objects and properties
fundamentally, then all event perception just is object and property perception. That is,
whenever we are perceiving an ordinary event, we are perceiving what is ultimately just a set of
objects and properties in the world. Because event perception, object perception, and property
perception are all directed at (only) objects and properties in the world, there is no reason – and it
is misleading – to distinguish event perception from object and property perception, since they
are not interestingly different, the thought goes.
What makes event perception interestingly different than object and property perception, I
maintain, is that our perceptual system responds to ordinary events differently than it responds to
ordinary objects and properties. This is so whether or not ordinary events ultimately reduce to
objects and properties in the world. When presented with an ordinary event, as opposed to a
mere ordinary object or property, we show a distinctive set of behavioral, neural, and
psychological effects. We token a unique type of perceptual representation. We usually don’t
token that type of perceptual representation when presented with a mere ordinary object or
property. Furthermore, not all cases of ordinary object and property perception are cases of
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ordinary event perception. We can perceive mere ordinary objects and properties, without
perceiving them to participate in any ordinary event. It is fair and interesting, then, to treat event
perception as a phenomenon that is distinct from object and property perception, because we
perceptually treat (ordinary) events differently than we perceptually treat (ordinary) objects and
properties.
Another pressing doubt about the possibility of event perception stems from the puzzle of
‘temporal perception’ (e.g., James 1886; LePoidevin 2004; Hoerl 2013; Phillips 2014). While
‘temporal perception’ is not limited to event perception, we can formulate the puzzle in terms of
event perception: perceiving an event requires perceiving that event at a given moment. Suppose
an event occurs from t1 through t2, and we perceive it from beginning to end. This requires our
perceiving the event at t1, and at t2. But the full event does not exist at any one moment; only a
temporal part of the event exists at t1, and at t2. This means that we actually cannot perceive the
event at t1, nor at t2; we can at most perceive a temporal part of the event at t1, and at t2. The event
itself – the full event – is not available to us perceptually at t1 nor at t2. This is because our
perception is limited to that which is present at a given moment, and because the full event
simply does not exist at a given moment. Because all that we perceive moment by moment is a
temporal part of the event, we never perceive the full event itself.
The immediate consequence is that we can at most cognize events, rather than perceive them.
Even though we can perceive each of the temporal parts of an event serially, this is not sufficient
for perceiving the full event. At best, after having perceived each of the temporal parts of an
event, we can cognize that all of those temporal parts belonged to a single event. Or, even as the
event is unfolding, we can remember that we have perceived certain temporal parts of it, and we
can expect that we’re going to perceive other temporal parts of it. But remembering, expecting,
and the like are cognitive activities, not perceptual activities. Because our perceptual capacities
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are limited to targeting that which is present in our environment at any moment, we cannot truly
perceive events (nor any items that take time to unfold).
As I see it, this formulation of the puzzle of temporal perception demands answers to two
questions: how it is that we can perceive an event given that we can perceive only that which is
immediately (i.e., at this very moment) present to us, and how it is that we can perceive an event
given that events do not fully exist at any one moment. These questions are importantly different,
as will become clear.
The first question rests on a false assumption. The assumption is that we can perceive only
that which is immediately present to us. I take this to be an assumption about something like
perceptual (or phenomenal) experience: we can perceive only a temporal part of an event at any
one time, since our perceptual/phenomenal experience is as of a still, unchanging environment
at any single moment.
If we grant that we perceive objects (as is the common view), however, this assumption must
be rejected (see, e.g., O’Callaghan 2011b). There is an obvious sense in which our perceptual
experience of an object at any one moment is limited to the parts of the object that we happen to be
perceiving at that moment. If, at t1, we are viewing a TV head-on, there is a sense in which we only
perceptually experience the front surface of the TV; we do not perceptually experience the back
surface of the TV, nor the bottom surface. This goes for any three-dimensional object that we
perceive. Our perceptual experience of an object at any one moment includes only some of the
object’s outer parts or surfaces.
(This is not meant to be a controversial claim. If putting it in terms of ‘perceptual experience’
sounds controversial, other terms will do – that which we ‘phenomenally experience’ at a
moment, that which is ‘phenomenally available’ to us at a moment, that which is ‘perceptually
accessible’ to us at a moment, that which is ‘directly perceptible’ at a moment, etc.)
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Despite the fact that at any moment, we can perceptually experience only some parts of an
object, we can nevertheless perceive the object at any one moment. Even when we experience only
the front of the TV, we’re still perceiving and perceptually representing the TV itself, of which
the front is only one part. We still perceptually treat the TV as an individual, which has features
that we are not currently experiencing, such as its back surface. We act as though this is true – we
would be surprised to find that, as we explore the TV, it is simply a façade.
Given that this is the ordinary view about object perception, we ought to say the same thing
about event perception. Even though we can perceptually experience only a temporal part of an
event at any moment, we can nevertheless perceive the event (that contains this temporal part) at
any moment. That is, for instance, at any moment during which we are listening to a song, we
are indeed perceiving the song, even though we are perceptually experiencing only a temporal part
of it. The fact that we can experience only a temporal part of an event at a moment does not
preclude our perceiving the event that partly consists in that temporal part, just as experiencing
only a spatial part of an object at a moment does not preclude our perceiving the object that has
that spatial part. Events pose no special problem in this regard.
But the second question raised in the puzzle of temporal perception suggests a different sense
in which events may pose a special problem. The question, again, is how it is that we can
perceive an event given that events do not fully exist at any one moment. Notice that there may
be a relevant difference between events and objects here. Let’s grant that while objects exist fully
in a moment, events necessarily take time to unfold. The worry is that for us to perceive some
item at a given time, that item must exist in the world at that time. If that item does not exist –
but, say, only a part of it exists –, then we cannot perceive that item at that time. Because an event
(in full) does not exist at a given moment, we cannot perceive that event at a moment. And
because an event does not exist fully at any moment during which it is unfolding, we cannot
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perceive the event at any moment during its lifespan, so we can never actually perceive the event.
This is not a problem with object perception, since objects exist fully in a moment. We can
perceive an object at any moment in its lifespan because the object is an item in the world that
exists at any one of those moments. We cannot perceive an event at any moment in its lifespan
because the event is not an item in the world that exists at any one of those moments.
Though this is a more pressing objection to event perception, it too rests on a false
assumption. The assumption is that whether an item fully exists at any one moment or takes time
to unfold makes a difference to our perception of it. For either type of item, we simply
perceptually experience parts of it at a time, and it takes us time to perceive more parts of it.
Consider again looking at the front surface at a TV at a moment. For us to see the back surface
of the TV, our perspective relative to the TV will have to change, which will take time. Either
we’ll have to move in the environment to be able to perceptually experience the back surface, or
the TV will have to rotate so that we can perceptually experience the back surface. In either case,
it will take time for us to perceptually experience all of the outer parts of the TV, or, indeed, any
part of it that we have not yet experienced.
The same exact phenomenon occurs with event perception. It of course takes time for us to
perceptually experience more and more features of an event, just as it takes time for us to
perceptually experience more and more features of an object. This being so, it does not matter
that an object exists fully in a moment while an event does not – we will perceptually experience
either individual bit by bit, across time. Even if events did exist fully in a moment, it would make
no difference perceptually. Just as with objects, we’d still perceptually experience the various
features of the event across time, not all at once.
We can thus perceive a given event at any moment during which it is unfolding, just as we
can perceive a given object at any moment during which we are presented with only a few of its
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parts. Whether an individual exists fully at a moment or not makes no difference to how we will
perceptually experience it moment by moment. Because we can perceive an event (like a song) at
any moment during which it is unfolding (like at the start of its chorus) – that is, because we can
perceive the individual at any moment –, we can perceive events.
I have argued that we perceive events, and that we have event representations. Event
representations are perceptual representations of a unique type of individual, namely, an event
(rather than an object). Our event representations are differentially sensitive to and track events
(rather than mere objects and properties) across time, so they are properly so-called.
Furthermore, we have event representations and perceive events even if events are not a
fundamental metaphysical kind, and despite the fact that, unlike objects, events take time to
unfold.
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3 Event Representations

Intuitive and empirical evidence suggests that we perceive events, like watching a TV show,
hearing a song, or feeling the rain fall. When presented with an item in the world that has the
canonical features of events – such as beginning and ending, unfolding across time, and having
objects and properties as participants –, we often token a perceptual representation of an event.
This event representation depicts the event in the world as an individual to which particular
features (objects and properties) are attributed.
Granting that we perceive events and have event representations, a significant question is
how event representations relate to other perceptual representations. For example, since we
perceptually attribute at least some objects or properties to every event, any token event
representation may or may not be identical to a set of token object and property representations.
A common view is that a perceptual representation of an individual, like an object, is not
identical to the set of features that are bound to it, since in order for us to perceive the set of
features as features of the same thing, the representation of the individual must be over and
above the representations of the features (Clark 2000, 2004; Cohen 2004; Jackson 1975). The
same may go for event representations, since they too are representations of individuals. If so, this
may threaten the dominant view in the philosophy of perception that we have (only) object and
property representations.
Another issue is whether there is a type of property that we typically perceptually attribute to
events but not to objects. Given, for instance, that events in the world can be slow-paced while
objects in the world cannot be, perhaps we can bind a representation of the property of ‘being
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slow-paced’ to event representations but not to object representations (at least not typically).
There may be an entire assortment of perceptible properties that are typically attributed only to
events. This would be interesting because it may suggest that there is a dimension along which
perceptible properties vary beyond the ‘high level vs. low level’ dimension (e.g., Siegel 2006;
Bayne 2009; Fish 2013; Montague 2017). Perceptible properties may be more variegated than
has been recognized due to the focus on a single type of individual that we perceive.
I will discuss the ways in which I take event representations to be related to other types of
perceptual representation. In particular, I will argue that event representations are not tokenidentical to sets of object or property representations, and that we typically perceptually attribute
the property of temporal boundness to events, but not to objects.

3.1 Identity
The fact that we have a certain type of perceptual representation does not imply that it is over and
above other types of perceptual representation. Suppose we have a type of perceptual
representation that is differentially sensitive to and tracks faces over time. Frequently, face
representations are tokened when presented with faces, and rarely are they tokened when not
presented with faces. Frequently, a given face representation is updated as a presented face
undergoes perceptible changes and is swapped when presented with a different face. Face
representations are a different type of representation than (mere) object or property
representations, since they are not differentially sensitive to, nor do they track, just any object or
property.
Even if this is so, it does not mean that face representations are over and above object and
property representations. In particular, token face representations may be identical to token
object representations, meaning our perceptual system treats faces just as a specific sort of object.
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Or, token face representations may be identical to token property representations, meaning our
perceptual system treats faces just as a certain sort of property (see, e.g., Block 2014). In these
cases, since token face representations would be identical to token object or property
representations, they would not be sui generis representations. They would not be over and
above token object or property representations.
The same goes for event representations. Just because we have a type of representation that is
differentially sensitive to and tracks events over time does not mean that event representations
are over and above object and property representations. I will suggest, however, that event
representations are indeed over and above object and property representations; token event
representations are not identical to (sets of) token object or property representations, but are
instead sui generis representations. For instance, when perceiving a person talking, our token
event representation is as of ‘a person talking’. This representation is over and above our
representations of the person and their properties; it is that which binds those representations,
enabling us to perceive the person and their properties as participants of the event of the person
talking. For any event that we perceptually represent, our event representation is as of the event
itself. Our perceptually attributing objects and properties to the events amounts to our event
representation binding our representations of those objects and properties. I will show how the
view that event representations are sui generis does a better job of explaining event perception
than various potential views according to which event representations are identical to token
object or property representations.
One potential view is that token event representations are nothing but sets of token property
representations. In particular, a token event representation is identical to the set of token
representations of the properties that we perceptually attribute to the event. When perceiving a
person talking, we may attribute to that event such properties as the colors, shapes, sizes,
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textures, and so on of the person’s body and the pitches, volumes, and timbres of the sounds they
are making. On this view, our representation of the person talking just is the set of
representations of the colors, shapes, pitches, and so on that we attribute to the event of the
person talking. Assuming the set can be temporally ordered, perceptually representing a token
event comes down to representing some properties at t1, then some (perhaps different) properties
at t2, and so on, for precisely as long as we represent the event.
This view may appeal to those who have doubts about the occurrence of ‘temporal
perception’, that is, perception of temporal properties such as duration, change, simultaneity, etc.
(see, e.g., Reid 1855; James 1886; Dainton 2008; LePoidevin 2004). One might maintain that
perception is limited to what is immediately present (rather than to what was or will be present), so
only properties – not individuals, which persist across time – are directly perceptible. Yet one
may grant that individuals, like objects and events, are indirectly or mediately perceptible, thanks to
our perceiving properties moment by moment. So, one may maintain that any perceptual
representation of an individual, which is differentially sensitive to and tracks a type of individual
in the world, is token-identical to a set of property representations.
This view may appeal as well to those who are interested in maintaining a sparse taxonomy
of perceptual representations (e.g., Tye 1984). One may treat property representations as the
only fundamental representation-type and all other representation-types as nothing but various
arrangements of property representations. The idea would be that a certain set of property
representations is tokened frequently when presented with a certain individual, and rarely when
not presented with that individual. Perceiving the individual to change would amount to tokening
different property representations in the set over time. Perceiving a new individual would amount
to tokening a new set of property representations.
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There is a major problem with the view that event representations are token-identical to sets
of property representations. If we want to admit that when perceiving an event, we’re perceiving
at least one individual – the event itself, and/or any of the objects that we perceptually attribute
to the event –, we cannot maintain that token event representations are simply sets of token
property representations. Because we perceptually attribute at least one object to most (if not all)
of the events that we perceive, I’ll start by establishing that object representations are not
themselves token-identical to sets of property representations.
As the ‘many properties problem’ (Jackson 1975) goes, perceiving (or perceptually
representing) ‘red square and blue circle’ is discriminable from perceiving ‘red circle and blue
square’. Yet the properties perceived in both situations are the same – red, square, blue, and
circular. Because the situations are discriminable, we must be perceiving (perceptually
representing) something other than just the four properties. Admitting perceptible spatial
relations won’t help. Even if the first situation is such that the red square is ‘to the left of’ the blue
circle, and the second is such that the red circle is ‘to the left of’ the blue square, ‘to the left of’ is
just an additional perceptible property that remains the same in the two situations, so it won’t
explain our ability to discriminate them.
What is required for the discriminability of the situations is our attributing particular subsets of
the four properties to distinct individuals in each situation. That is, in the first situation, we
attribute ‘red’ and ‘square’ to a single individual, and ‘blue’ and ‘circular’ to a different
individual. This enables us to perceive one item as being both red and square, and another item as
being both blue and circular. In the second situation, we must attribute ‘red’ and ‘circular’ to a
single individual, and ‘blue’ and ‘square’ to another. Because we are representing four distinct
individuals across the two situations, the situations are discriminable.
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The many properties problem shows that in order to perceive an item as having multiple
properties, we must perceptually represent an individual that binds or bears those properties (Clark
2000, 2004; Cohen 2004; O’Callaghan 2008; Batty 2010). In order for the representation of the
individual to do the necessary binding work, it cannot itself be token-identical to a set of property
representations. It must be over and above the property representations.
In most cases of event perception, wherein we perceptually attribute at least one object to the
event, then, the event representation is not token-identical to a set of property representations.
This is because the object representations themselves are not token-identical to sets of property
representations, but are over and above them. Because we perceptually attribute those objects to
the event, the token event representation itself is not just a set of token property representations.
On the view that event representations are sui generis, the fact that we perceptually attribute
at least one object to most of the events that we perceive is easily accounted for. In fact, it is built
into the view that token event representations are themselves individuals to which token
representations of features – including objects and properties – can be bound. This remains so
once we grant that token object representations are over and above sets of token property
representations, since objects are just one of the sorts of features that we can perceptually
attribute to events.
Another potential view is that event representations are token-identical to single, rich
property representations (rather than to sets of property representations). On this view,
perceptually representing the event of a person talking just is perceptually representing the
property ‘is a person talking’. The property itself may be thought to unfold over time or to be
instantiated moment by moment. Importantly, on this view, the property representation would
not be bound to an event representation – we would not perceptually attribute ‘is a person
talking’ to a perceptible event. Instead, the property representation ‘is a person talking’ would be
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token-identical to our event representation of the person talking. In other words, there would be
nothing more to our representing this event than our representing the property ‘is a person
talking’.
This view may appeal to those who wish to keep a sparse taxonomy of perceptual
representations, since again, all representations could come down to property representations. A
potential benefit of this view over the view that event representations are token-identical to sets of
property representations is that there is no binding work to worry about. That is, because a token
event representation is just a single property representation on this view, it may be that no
individual over and above that property representation need be posited, since the many
properties problem is a problem only when we perceive a single item to have multiple properties.
The richness of a property like ‘is a person talking’ could do away with the problem of binding
our representations of all of the properties of the person and of the sounds they make, since all of
those properties would be encompassed by our representation of the single, rich property.
There are problems with the view that any event representation is token-identical to a single,
rich property representation. The first is that it misconstrues event representations as property
representations, when they are in fact individual representations. Like object representations,
event representations are as of items that bear perceptible features, persist across time, are
discriminable from other items in a scene, and are discriminable from each other in a scene. As
argued in Chapter 2, we know this on the basis of the empirical work on event perception. If
event representations were token-identical to rich property representations, they at least would
not be able to bear features, since property representations do not themselves bear features. But,
as argued in Chapter 2, in order to account for phenomena like event completion (Strickland and
Keil 2011; Brockhoff et al. 2016; Papenmeier et al. 2019), we should posit that we attribute
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objects and properties to events themselves. This requires event representations to be as of
individuals, rather than properties.
This means, then, that event representations are not token-identical to property
representations at all. If our event representation of a person talking were itself just a
representation as of the rich property ‘is a person talking’, then our event representation would
not bind any object or property representations (such as representations of the person and their
properties), since property representations are not the kind of thing that bind other
representations. We thus would not perceptually represent the event of the person talking to be
an item that bears features. Yet the empirical evidence suggests that we do perceptually represent
events to be items that bear features. So, we must posit that event representations are neither
type- nor token-identical to property representations. Property representations are not the right
kind of thing to do the work that event representations do in event perception.
A second, related problem is that if our event representation of a person talking is itself just a
representation of the rich property ‘is a person talking’, there is no room for object
representations to play a significant role in event perception. When perceiving the event of a
person talking, we in fact token our object representation of ‘a person’. On the view in question,
though, this object representation is doing no work in our perceptual representation of the event
of the person talking, since our representation of the event is said to be just a representation of a
property. It would be odd to say that we attribute the property ‘is a person talking’ to the object
‘a person’, since ‘a person is a person talking’ is redundant. And in any case, this is not the
correct direction of attribution for event perception. The empirical evidence suggests that when
perceiving events, we attribute properties and objects to events, but if our event representation of a
person talking is token-identical to the property ‘is a person talking’, and we perceptually
attribute this to the object ‘a person’, then we have perceptually attributed an event to an object.
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This is inconsistent with what the empirical research on event perception suggests is the norm for
event perception. (Of course, attributing a property to an object is not unusual in event
perception. What would be unusual in this case would be attributing the event to the object.)
Notice, for that matter, that on this view, we do not attribute ‘is a person talking’ to an event, since
on this view, our representation of the event is simply token-identical to ‘is a person talking’.
Thus, the view that event representations are token-identical to single, rich property
representations will not do. It is inconsistent with the empirical facts that event representations
are representations as of individuals (rather than properties), and that we perceptually attribute
objects and properties to events (rather than attributing events to objects). Alternatively, the view that
event representations are sui generis accommodates these facts. Maintaining that our event
representation of a person talking is a sui generis event representation as of ‘a person talking’
rightfully construes the event representation as an individual representation. The event
representation is thus capable of binding the relevant object and property representations. This
view, for the same reason, fits the fact that we perceptually attribute objects and properties to
events. The event representation is the thing that binds the information about the objects and
properties that we attribute to the event, enabling us to perceive those objects and properties as
participating in that event.
It is not the case, then, that any event representation is token-identical to a single, rich
property representation. Nor is any event representation token-identical to a set of property
representations. Yet there are various potential views according to which any event
representation is token-identical to an object representation.
One potential view is that an event representation is token-identical to an object
representation (or a set of object representations) within a particular timeframe. The thought is
that representing the event of a person talking as occurring from t1 until t3 would be nothing
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more than representing the object ‘a person’ from t1 until t3. We would perceive the event to
have precisely the properties that we perceptually attribute to the person during that timeframe,
since our object representation of the person would itself bind our representations of the
properties that we attribute to the person. If, afterward, we don’t perceive the person to
participate in any event from t4 to t5, then our representation of the person would not count as
an event representation in that timeframe. It’s only when we perceive the person to participate in
some event that the representation of the person is token-identical to an event representation, on
this view. This may be explained by the claim that, on some occasions, the properties that we
perceive the person to have are indicative of their participating in an event (maybe because, for
instance, the properties are perceived to undergo a pattern of change), while on other occasions,
the properties that we perceive the person to have are not so indicative.
This view is appealing because of its straightforwardness. One might question what more
there could be to perceptually representing a given event than simply representing the objects,
along with their properties, that we perceive to participate in that event. One might worry that
the view that event representations are sui generis seems to suggest that there is mysterious eventspecific information that is added to our perceptual experience of events on top of our experience
of the relevant objects and their properties, and that it is unclear what that information could
possibly be and how it could help explain event perception. Treating token event representations
as simply token object representations (which already bind property representations) within
particular timeframes takes much of the mystery out of event perception.
But there are problems with this view. Similar to the view that event representations are
token-identical to rich property representations, it fails to account for our perceptual attribution
of objects and properties to events. The only perceptual attribution that occurs in event perception
on this view is of properties to objects, and it is by perceptually representing the relevant objects
71

within a timeframe that we represent the event. But the empirical evidence suggests that we
perceptually attribute objects and properties to events themselves, and that is how we perceive a
given event to have objects and properties as participants.
The view that event representations are token-identical to object representations within a
timeframe is also inconsistent with the fact that we can perceive a single object (or set of objects)
to participate in multiple distinct events within the same timeframe. We can perceive a single
person to sing for precisely as long as they do jumping jacks, or a speaker to a play a shrill, singlepitched beeping sound while playing a smooth glissando sound, or a truck to making a beeping
sound while backing up. As a first pass, these pairs of events can be considered distinct to our
perceptual system because they involve different sets of perceptible features or different patterns
of changes in their features over time. But if a token event representation is identical to a token
object representation in a given timeframe, the pairs of events would not be distinguishable to
our perceptual system, since they involve the same object in the same timeframe.
Plus, when it comes to events that have multiple perceptible objects as participants, a binding
problem similar to the many properties problem occurs. Suppose we perceive a basketball game
from t1 to t2. On this view, our event representation of the basketball game is token-identical to
our representations of the set of objects that we perceive to participate in the basketball game (the
players, the ball, etc.) from t1 to t2. For us to perceive all of those objects (and none of the other
objects in the scene) as features of a single individual (the event of the basketball game, in this
case), we must perceptually attribute all of them to that individual. Otherwise, we would not
perceive them as features of the same individual, nor, thus, as participants in the same event. The
fact that we are perceiving all of the objects in the event within the same timeframe is not enough
to do this binding work, since in any scene, we’re likely to be perceiving innumerable objects that
we don’t perceive to participate in the event within the same timeframe. Some single
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representation as of an individual must serve to bind together our representations of all of the
relevant (and none of the irrelevant) objects in the scene. For events that involve more than one
perceptible object, our representation of the event is not, then, token-identical to our set of
representations of the objects within a timeframe.
The view that event representations are sui generis does not face the problems of this view. As
already noted, it makes sense of our perceptually attributing objects and properties to events. It
also enables us to perceive multiple distinct events in the same timeframe. Each event that we
perceptually represent gets its own event representation. When perceiving a beeping sound and a
glissando sound simultaneously, we have one event representation of ‘beeping’ and another event
representation of ‘glissando’. We perceive these events to be distinct thanks to our having a
separate representation of each.
The sui generis view posits that event representations themselves do the work of binding
multiple object representations together, when perceiving an event with multiple objects. An
event representation is itself a representation as of an individual, so it is capable of binding
representations of objects or properties. When perceiving ‘a game of basketball’, we perceptually
attribute the various objects like ‘this player’, ‘that player’, ‘the ball’, and so on to the event. Our
event representation of the game of basketball binds together all of the relevant object
representations, so we can perceive all of those objects to participate in the game of basketball.
The view that event representations are sui generis avoids the problems of the views that
event representations are token-identical to sets of property representations, rich property
representations, and object representations within a timeframe. This is because it rightly
construes token event representations to be as of individuals, to which our representations of the
objects and properties we perceive to participate in events can be bound.

73

However, given that the sui generis view gets most of its explanatory leverage from treating
token event representations as representations as of individuals, there may be room for an
alternative view that gets the same explanatory leverage from treating event representations as
token-identical to object representations, since object representations are themselves individual
representations. Perhaps, for instance, event representations are token-identical to event-like
object representations, which are special object representations that depict the object as having a
short lifespan (relative to most object representations). On this view, our event representation of a
person talking is token-identical to our object representation ‘a person talking’, which is as of an
object that has a much shorter lifespan than most objects we perceptually represent (such as ‘a
person’). This view takes the event itself to be represented as an object, but one that does not last
long. Importantly, on this view, the event representation is not token-identical to our
representation of the object (or objects) that we perceive to participate in the event; instead, it is
token-identical to an additional object representation, to which our representations of the objects
that we perceive to participate in the event are bound. So, on this view, our event representation
of a person talking is not token-identical to our object representation ‘a person’, but to a second
object representation of ‘a person talking’, to which the former is bound. The second object
representation would represent the object to last for precisely as long as we perceive the event to
last.
This view avoids the problems I’ve listed with the other views. Because object representations
are representations as of individuals, they can serve to bind the representations of other objects
and properties that are attributed to them. When perceiving a basketball game, an event-like
object representation of ‘a game of basketball’ could bind our representations of the objects in the
event (the players and the ball) and of the properties in the event (the shapes, sizes, locations, and
so on of the objects). This allows for the correct direction of attribution. We are perceptually
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attributing objects and properties to the event, and on this view, this is done by our
representations of those objects and properties being bound to our representation of the eventlike object. It also allows for multiple object representations to be bound to the same event-like
object representation. There is no trouble binding representations of the several players and the
ball to the single ‘game of basketball’ representation, since the latter is simply a representation as
of an individual that bears several features. This view also has no trouble accommodating our
ability to perceive a single object as participating in multiple distinct events simultaneously. On
this view, each distinct event that we perceive has its own event-like object representation, which
can bind representations of different sets of objects. So, when hearing a beeping and a glissando,
we’d have both a ‘beeping’ and ‘glissando’ event-like object representation, each of which could
bind our representation of the speaker that the sounds are playing from.
Furthermore, the view that event representations are token-identical to event-like object
representations may be seen as more parsimonious than the view that event representations are
sui generis, just because we would not have to posit event representations to be over and above
object and property representations. We could stick with just object and property representations
and go a far way explaining event perception. This view may have additional appeal to those
who think that events just are short-lived or fast-paced objects, metaphysically (e.g., Goodman
1951).
The off-putting, though perhaps not devastating, thing about this view is that we are positing
a special sort of object representation (namely, an event-like object representation, to which
representations of all of the objects and properties we perceive to participate in the event are
bound) just to reduce event representations to. As long as we are positing a new sort of individual
representation just to explain event perception, it seems more fitting to posit a sui generis event
representation. Representations as of ‘a person talking’, ‘rain falling’, ‘a song playing’, and the
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like seem more event-like than object-like, since they are representations as of events in the
world, and since many of the canonical features of events are available to us perceptually when
presented with an event (their beginning and ending, their unfolding over time, etc.). It is unclear
what an event-like object representation would be, if not merely a sui generis event
representation. If there is a significant difference between the two, it would have to be shown
how one does more explanatory work than the other. But drawing a significant difference
between the two threatens to construe the event-like object representation as more object-like
than event-like (since the only potentially relevant difference between event representations and
event-like object representations is that only the latter is an object representation), and this does
not seem to be the right direction to go in when explaining event perception. If, on the other
hand, there isn’t a significant difference – and it seems to me there isn’t –, then positing one or
the other will not matter much for the project of explaining event perception, since they will do
the same explanatory work.
I conclude, then, that event representations are sui generis representations. They are not
identical to token object nor property representations, but are over and above object and
property representations. When perceiving a game of basketball, we token a sui generis event
representation as of ‘a game of basketball’. This event representation binds our representations of
the players, the ball, and all of their properties. It is thanks to the object and property
representations being bound to the event representation that we perceive all of those objects and
properties (and none of the other objects and properties in the scene) as participating in the game
of basketball. For each event we perceive, we represent it with its own event representation,
which will bind representations of a particular set of objects and properties in the scene, enabling
us to perceive discrete sets of features as participating in discrete events in the scene,
simultaneously or serially.
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There are two interesting upshots of the sui generis view of event representations. One is that
it allows for the possibility that we perceptually attribute certain properties to events that we
never attribute to objects, such as ‘being leisurely’. Because the event representation is an
individual representation, it can bind property representations itself; the property representations
need not first be bound to object representations, which are then bound to the event
representation (although this happens as well). So, when perceiving someone taking a leisurely
walk, it could be that not only do we perceptually attribute the properties of the person (their
shape, size, etc.) to the person, and attribute the person to the event of the leisurely walk. We
might also perceptually attribute the property of ‘being leisurely’ to the event of the leisurely walk
itself, without attributing it to any object. If there are any properties that we perceptually
attribute directly to events themselves, the sui generis view has no trouble accommodating this.
The second upshot is that the sui generis view allows for the possibility that there are some
events that we do not perceive as having any objects as participants. Potential examples may
include perceiving a light mist falling or a cool breeze blowing. It is not obvious whether we
perceptually represent a light mist or a cool breeze as objects. In many cases, the spatial
boundaries of a mist and a breeze are unclear perceptually; we often do not discriminate visually
or tactually where exactly the mist or breeze lie from where they do not lie in the world. Just as
well, the spatial boundaries of the droplets involved in a mist are unclear, and we often don’t
discriminate the droplets from each other, neither visually nor tactually.
But it is clear that when perceiving such events as the light mist falling or the cool breeze
blowing, we are perceiving properties. We perceive the former as involving the properties of being
light, cool, and wet, and the latter as involving the properties of being cool, dry, and of a certain
strength. To perceive the light mist falling or the cool breeze blowing as having several properties
in the scene as participants, all of those properties must be attributed to a single individual.
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Otherwise, we would not be able to discriminate the mist or the breeze from other items in the
scene (like nearby cars, trees, buildings, and their properties). And if there are no object
representations that can bind the many properties together, it must be that event representations
are doing the binding work.
If there are indeed any perceptible events that we do not perceive to have objects as
participants, the view that event representations are sui generis easily accommodates them. We
can have an event representation as of ‘a light mist falling’, to which our representations of the
properties of being light, cool, and wet are bound. The fact that the event representation binds
the property representations together (in the absence of object representations) is what enables
our perception of the light mist falling as a discrete unit in the scene.
I have argued that token event representations are sui generis, so they are not identical to
token object or property representations. I will now explore the possibility of our perceptually
attributing event-specific properties to events.

3.2 Temporal Boundness
It seems that events in the world can have certain properties that objects in the world cannot
have, such as being slow-paced, hard to follow, tragic, anticlimactic, etc. This being so, perhaps
some of the properties that are unique to events are perceptible, and perhaps we typically
perceptually attribute them to events, but not to objects. As already noted, perhaps we can
perceptually attribute the property of ‘being leisurely’ directly to the event of a person taking a
leisurely walk, without attributing it to the person, and, furthermore, without attributing it to any
object in typical cases. While these sorts of examples are familiar from the metaphysics of events
(e.g., Kim 1976), the possibility that there exists a set of properties that are perceptually
attributable uniquely to events is significant.
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Admitting the existence of such perceptible properties could be admitting a whole new type of
perceptible property. Many philosophers have individuated types of perceptible properties along
the ‘high level vs. low level’ dimension (e.g., Siegel 2006; Bayne 2009; Fish 2013; Montague
2017). This dimension has to do with the relative complexity or richness of a property. Generally,
simple properties like shape, color, pitch, and size are considered low level, while kind properties
like ‘is a tomato’, ‘is a tree’, and ‘is a face’ are considered high level. Yet it is commonplace to
construe all properties as items that can be attributed to one individual or another.
Once we grant, however, that event representations are a sui generis representation, this
opens the door for new dimensions along which perceptible properties may vary. One such
dimension may be whether or not a perceptible property is typically attributed to events and
atypically attributed to objects. If there are any properties that are typically attributed to events,
it may be faulty to treat all properties as items that are perceptually attributed to one individual
or another, as though all properties are generic. Instead, some properties may be better thought
of as attributable only to a certain type of individual (in typical cases).
I will argue that there is at least one property that we typically perceptually attribute to events
and not to objects. It is the property of ‘having a beginning and end in time’, or ‘being
temporally bound’, as I’ll call it. In most cases, we perceptually treat events as things that have a
(fairly local) beginning and end in time, and in most cases, we do not perceptually treat objects as
things that have a (fairly local) beginning and end in time.
As argued in Chapter 2, empirical evidence shows that we are perceptually sensitive to the
beginnings and ends of events. When presented with the beginning or end of an event, we display
a host of behavioral, neural, and psychological effects. For instance, when asked to push a button
whenever one event in a movie ends and another begins, we do so reliably (Zacks et al. 2007;
Speer et al. 2003). The points that we mark as boundaries between successive events correspond
79

with the sorts of changes that are typical of the ending of one event in the world and/or the
beginning of another, such as changes in which objects are present, in activities that people are
doing, in spatiotemporal location, etc. (Zacks et al. 2009; Zacks et al. 2006). A set of neural
regions is activated transiently at these points as well, both when we are watching movies
passively and when we are completing the segmentation task (Zacks et al. 2001; Zacks et al. 2010;
Speer et al. 2003). Furthermore, our memory of the boundaries between successive events is
better than our memory of what occurs within any single event (Newtson and Engquist 1976;
Swallow et al. 2009; Boltz 1992).
It is unlikely that we would display this set of effects when presented with mere objects, rather
than events. There is no reason to think that subjects would mark points at which they thought
‘one meaningful unit of activity has ended and another has begun’ (e.g., Eisenberg and Zacks
2016; Kurby and Zacks 2018) reliably when viewing objects that are not doing anything (i.e., not
participating in any perceptible events). And given that the neural and psychological effects
associated with perceiving the beginnings and ends of events either occur at the points that
subjects mark as the beginnings and ends of events, or at least depend on where subjects have
marked those boundaries, there is just as well no reason to think that we’d see the typical set of
neural and psychological effects if subjects were presented with mere objects for a short time. We
are, then, perceptually sensitive to the beginnings and ends of events, and this seems to point to
an interesting difference between event perception and object perception.
One might deny, however, that our perceptual sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of
events reveals anything unique about event perception. Events in the world typically have a
beginning and an end. We are often perceptually presented with the beginnings and ends of
events in the world, in part because many of the events that we are presented with have relatively
short lifespans. It is not unusual for us to perceive the beginning or end (or, indeed, the entirety)
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of an episode of a TV show, a song, a person cooking a meal, etc. We can just as well think of
objects as having beginnings and ends, wherein their ‘beginning’ would be their coming-intobeing and their ‘end’ would be their ceasing-to-be. We are much less frequently presented with
the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ of objects in the world, in part because most of the objects that we
perceive have relatively long lifespans. We typically do not perceive the coming-into-being or
ceasing-to-be (much less the entire lifespan) of a cup, a dog, a tree, a table, a building, etc.
One might maintain, then, that we in fact display the behavioral, neural, and psychological
effects associated with our perceptual sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of events whenever
we are presented with the coming-into-being and ceasing-to-be of objects. It’s just that we
typically are not presented with them, so we infrequently exercise our perceptual sensitivity to
them. On this view, then, our perceptual sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of events does not
signify an interesting difference between event perception and object perception, for we are
perceptually sensitive to the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ of objects just as well.
I grant that it might be the case that we show the effects associated with our perceptual
sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of events when presented with the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’
of objects. This has yet to be determined empirically. Yet I maintain that, apart perhaps from
cases in which we are presented with the ‘beginning’ and/or ‘end’ of an object, there is no reason
to think that we would show these effects when presented with a mere object, that is, an object
that is not participating in any perceptible event. The ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of an object might be
sufficiently similar to the beginning and end of an event for us to show the effects, but when
otherwise presented with a mere object not doing anything, we are not presented with anything
sufficiently similar to the beginning and end of an event to show the effects.
Notice that being perceptually sensitive to the ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of an object is different
from being perceptually sensitive to the beginning and end of the presentation of an object to us.
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We may be able to tell perceptually that a cup is presented to us at t1 and ceases to be presented
to us at t2, but this does not mean that we have exercised our perceptual sensitivity to the
‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of the cup. The cup, after all, presumably had existed well before t1 and will
exist well after t2, and, furthermore, just because we have stopped perceiving it does not mean
that we represent it as ceasing to exist. Any empirical work that is meant to gauge whether we are
in fact perceptually sensitive to the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ of objects, just like we’re sensitive to
the beginnings and ends of events, would have to take care to not conflate the ‘beginning’ and
‘end’ of an object with the beginning and end of its presentation to subjects.
While I grant that it may be the case that we are perceptually sensitive to the ‘beginnings’ and
‘ends’ of objects in the same way we are sensitive to the beginnings and ends of events, I maintain
nevertheless that our perceptual sensitivity to the beginnings and ends of events points to
something unique about event perception. Specifically, it gives us prima facie reason to think that
we typically attribute temporal boundness to events, and at most atypically attribute temporal
boundness to objects. The fact that we frequently exercise our perceptual sensitivity to the
beginnings and ends of events makes it plausible to think that our perceptual system positively
treats events as the type of thing that has a beginning and end, by binding a representation of
temporal boundness to event representations. And given that we relatively infrequently exercise
our perceptual sensitivity to the ‘beginnings’ and ‘ends’ of objects, it’s plausible that our
perceptual system does not treat objects as the sort of thing that is temporally bound, but instead
as the sort of thing that persists indefinitely.
Perceptually attributing temporal boundness to an individual is, though, more than simply
being perceptually sensitive to its temporal boundaries. A particularly telling case would be one
in which we are not presented with the beginning or end of an event – and thus do not exercise
our sensitivity to its temporal boundaries –, yet we nevertheless perceptually treat the event as
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having a beginning and end. For example, suppose we are presented with most of a song, but not
its beginning nor end; suppose loud conversations in the environment mask the first and last ten
seconds of the song. Even though we are not perceptually presented with the beginning nor end
of the song (at least, in a way that enables us to actually hear the beginning and end), it may be
that our perceptual system nevertheless treats the song as having a beginning and end that are
fairly close temporally to the parts of the song that we heard. In other words, our perceptual
system may treat the song not as persisting indefinitely, but as being temporally bound (where the
temporal boundaries are fairly local). If cases such as this exist, it would establish that we are not
merely perceptually sensitive to the temporal boundaries of events, but we positively perceptually
attribute temporal boundness to events.
Studies on occlusion in event perception are a nudge in favor our attributing temporal
boundness to events even when we are not perceptually presented with their boundaries. We can
hear a glissando as a single ongoing sound even when it is masked by white noise multiple times
(Dannenbring 1976). We can (mistakenly) take ourselves to have heard portions of speech that
were actually masked by unrelated sounds and understand the meanings of the spoken sentences
accurately (Warren 1970). We can hear an ongoing background noise, such as the running of an
air conditioner or the flowing of a river, as continuous when it is masked by white noise, whether
or not it is in fact present during the masking (McWalter and McDermott 2019). Occlusion of a
given event, then, is not sufficient for our perceptual system treating the event as having come to
an end.
The fact that we can perceive an event as persisting despite occlusion, and can furthermore
attribute to it features that we had missed during occlusion, lends support to the claim that we
can perceptually attribute temporal boundness to events even when we are not presented with
their beginning or end. It establishes that we can fill in gaps in our perception of events. Thus,
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there is some empirical reason to think that if we miss the beginning or end of a given event, we
can nevertheless perceptually treat the event as having a beginning and end.
Yet treating an event as persisting during occlusion is not quite the same as treating an event
as having a beginning and end, even when we haven’t been presented with them. For example, it
could be that we perceptually treat an event as persisting in many cases of occlusion, but we do
not do so in cases where the beginning or end of an event are occluded. That is, if we miss five
seconds of the middle of a song because of a masking noise, we perceptually treat the song as
having persisted during the noise; but if we miss the first or final five seconds of a song due to a
masking noise, we do not treat the song as having persisted during the noise.
There is no good reason to believe that it is so. It would require our perceptual system to
distinguish occluded beginnings and ends from occluded middles of events. If our perceptual
system did not distinguish them, then it would complete occluded beginnings and ends, just as it
completes occluded middles of events. But, if our perceptual system has distinguished occluded
beginnings and ends from occluded middles of events, then it has already recognized that the
event indeed persisted during the occluded beginning and end. Telling whether an occluded part
was a beginning or end, rather than another part, of an event requires recognizing, first of all,
that the event persisted during the occlusion. So, claiming that we do not treat events as
persisting during occluded beginnings and ends, but we do treat events as persisting during
occluded middles, itself requires our treating events as persisting during occluded beginnings and
ends. This is not a tenable view.
A more plausible alternative is that we indeed treat an event as persisting even when we miss
its beginning or end, but in these cases, we do not perceptually treat the occluded parts as the
event’s beginning or end per se. So, in the case where we miss the first and last five seconds of a
song but hear the rest of it, we perceptually treat the song as having persisted before we started
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hearing it and after we stopped hearing it, yet we do not tag the missing parts as being (or at least
including) the actual beginning and end of the song. In other words, occlusion of the event’s
beginning or end is not treated as a special case of occlusion by our perceptual system. It is simply
another case in which we treat an event as persisting. This is, I suggest, the strongest conclusion
we can accept on the basis of the occlusion studies on event perception with good reason.
Treating an event as persisting through the time slots occupied by its beginning or end that we
missed does not appear to pose any more of a challenge to our perceptual system than treating an
event as persisting during any other part of it that we have missed. The evidence for event
completion despite occlusion, then, supports our completing events even when we miss their
beginning or end.
The claim that we perceptually attribute temporal boundness to events even when we miss
their beginning or end is even stronger, though. To treat an event as persisting during the time
slots occupied by its beginning or end that we missed is not yet to treat the event as having a
beginning or end that falls in those time slots. The former is consistent with perceptually treating the
event to persist indefinitely, rather than as being temporally bound.
I will take it for granted that we typically perceptually treat objects as persisting indefinitely.
Ample empirical evidence has demonstrated that our perceptual system achieves object
permanence (e.g., Piaget 1954; Baillargeon et al. 1985; Spelke 1990; Bremner et al. 2014). We do
not perceptually treat objects as having a fairly local beginning and end in time, or a fairly short
lifespan. Instead, we typically expect the objects in our environment to stick around and remain
intact. We would be surprised if an object suddenly disappeared or disintegrated.
This is not so for events, I suggest. Even though we can perceptually treat events as persisting
despite occlusion, we typically do not treat them as persisting indefinitely. We typically have
expectations that the events that we perceive have fairly short lifespans, and we behave in a way
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that accords with these expectations. For instance, say we are watching TV and a commercial
comes on. Our perceptual system will register that a new event has begun. It will also treat the
commercial as being temporally bound, even before we are presented with its end. This, I
suggest, is shown by our behavior and expectations. We expect the commercial to come to an
end soon (in this case, in less than a minute). We would be surprised if the commercial continued
for several minutes. Our expectation also guides our behavior. We may choose to sit through the
whole commercial precisely because we know it will not last long, and that the next event on the
TV network will begin soon. Or, we may leave the room briefly, knowing it won’t be long before
the commercial comes to an end and the next event on the network begins. When the
commercial comes to an end, our perceptual system registers this, which typically accords with
our expectations as to when the event will end.
So, perceptually attributing temporal boundness to events helps explain our expectations and
behavior as we are perceiving events. We expect the event that we are perceiving to come to an
end fairly soon (though what counts as ‘fairly soon’ may vary by event type). Just as well, in cases
where we miss the beginning of an event, we typically still treat the event as having begun fairly
recently. For instance, if we walk into a room in which the chorus of a pop song is playing, in
most cases, we would expect that the pop song had not been playing for long before we started
hearing it. It would be surprising to learn that it had already been playing for quite some time
(say, over ten minutes). It would just as well be surprising to learn that the playing of the song had
begun right when we began hearing it (at its chorus, rather than at the song’s beginning). Even
though our perceptual system would have registered a new event when we started hearing the
song, this does not preclude us from perceptually attributing a beginning to the playing of the
song that occurred prior to the part of the song that we first heard.
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While it is clear that we typically cognitively represent events as being temporally bound – we
know that most of the events we are presented with have a fairly local beginning and end –, it is
less clear that we do so perceptually. But, I suggest, as long as we are willing to grant that we
perceptually represent objects as being spatially bound, we should also grant that we perceptually
represent events as being temporally bound, since the latter is not any more demanding for the
perceptual system. In fact, our perceptually attributing temporal boundness to events can be seen
as analogous to our attributing spatial boundness to objects (see, e.g., O’Callaghan 2008, 2007;
Zacks and Tversky 2001).
When presented with three-dimensional objects, we perceptually treat them as having spatial
boundaries that package them into discrete units that are not too big or small for us to perceive.
This is so even though, when presented with any three-dimensional object, we are not presented
with all of its spatial boundaries (or surfaces) at any one time. At any time, there are parts (edges,
surfaces, etc.) of the object that are hidden from us. But we nevertheless perceptually treat the
object as being spatially bound – we treat it as having spatial boundaries that fully demarcate it
from the rest of the environment, and that are fairly close (spatially) to the parts of the object that
we are presented with, even though we do not perceive all of its spatial boundaries. This has been
well established by research on object completion (e.g., Spelke 1990; Kellman and Spelke 1983;
Kestenbaum, Termine, and Spelke 1987; Soska and Johnson 2008).
Since it is widely accepted that object completion counts as a perceptual activity – and, thus,
that we perceptually attribute spatial boundness to objects, even when not presented with all of
their boundaries –, we ought just as well to accept that we perceptually attribute temporal
boundness to events, even when not presented with their beginning or end. Attributing temporal
boundness to events is no more demanding than attributing spatial boundness to objects. In both
cases, we perceptually treat the individual as having boundaries that are fairly close to the parts
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of the individual that we are currently presented with, which demarcate the individual from the
rest of the world.
I have argued that we typically perceptually attribute temporal boundness to events, even
when not presented with their beginning or end, and that we atypically perceptually attribute
temporal boundness to objects (instead, we typically perceptually treat objects as persisting
indefinitely). But there are interesting atypical cases of event perception and object perception.
First, it is worth noting that our perceptual system cannot discriminate all events that we are
presented with. Some events are too long, too abstract, or the like – such as the season of winter,
the presidential election, an imprudent act of vengeance – for us to perceive (at least, as such, or
as events). There are limits to our perceptual capacities. The same goes, of course, for object
perception. We cannot perceive ‘North America’, ‘the government’, or ‘the most intimidating
person in the room’ as such, or as objects.
But among the events that we can perceive, there are a few types of cases in which we may
not perceptually attribute boundness to them. The first type is one in which we perceive just a
snippet of an ongoing event. For instance, we perceive just a few seconds of a helicopter’s flight as
it passes above us in the sky, or we hear just a snippet of a song playing in a car as the car drives
past us, or we perceive just a glimpse of a baseball game as we drive past the field. An analogous
case of object perception would be one in which we perceive only a very small part of the object.
Assuming that we perceive ‘the helicopter’s flight’, ‘the playing of the song’, and ‘the baseball
game’ as events that extend beyond the small slice of them that we are presented with (and
granting that these events are not too long or abstract to be perceptible), it may be that we do not
perceptually attribute temporal boundness to them. Our perceptual system may not have
received enough information about the event to recognize that it is the kind of thing that has a
beginning and end (that we have not been presented with). Our perceptual system may instead
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treat the event as persisting indefinitely, which is less committal than tagging the missing
segments as being or including the beginning or end of the event.
Yet, I assume that in general, when we are perceiving some event, our perceptual system is
just as well treating the sub-events that we are presented with (which the larger event at least
partly consists in) as events themselves (see, e.g., Gibson 2015, p. 94). In support of this, empirical
work has shown that the points at which subjects mark the beginnings and ends of successive
events at a coarse grain tend to align with the points they mark at a fine grain (e.g., Zacks, Tversky,
and Iyer 2001). This is one reason to think that we’re perceiving the sub-events that a given event
consists in as the event is unfolding. So, even if we do not perceptually treat ‘the helicopter’s
flight’, ‘the playing of the song’, and ‘the baseball game’ as being temporally bound, we
nevertheless treat the parts of the event that we are presented with as being temporally bound.
The second type of case in which we may not perceptually attribute temporal boundness to
an event is one in which we perceive a relatively small part of a long event (one that’s not too
long to be imperceptible). For instance, we perceive a few minutes of a concert, a movie, or a
baseball game. An analogous case of object perception would be one in which we perceive a part
of a large (but perceptible) object, like the bottom portion of a tall building. In this type of case,
the beginning and end of the event may extend too far beyond the parts of the event that we are
presented with for our perceptual system to treat the event as being temporally bound. It might,
more neutrally, treat the event as persisting indefinitely. Here too, even if it does not treat the
event as being temporally bound, it nevertheless treats the sub-events that we are presented with
as temporally bound.
So, it may be that some perceptible events are too long, at least relative to the slices of them
that we are presented with, for our perceptual system to treat the events as being temporally
bound. The temporal boundaries may be too far removed from the parts we are presented with
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for us to perceptually treat the event as having temporal boundaries. Where exactly the line falls
between the perceptible events that we are partially presented with yet can nevertheless
perceptually attribute temporal boundness to, and those that we cannot nevertheless perceptually
attribute temporal boundness to, is an empirical question. An analogous question exists with
respect to object perception. It may be that our perceptual system does not treat every object as
being spatially bound (that is, as having fairly local spatial boundaries), since the spatial
boundaries of some objects may lie too far from the parts of the object that we are presented with
(either because we are perceiving a very small part of it or because the object is quite large). This
may be the case when, e.g., we look at a mountain when standing at its foothills, we look at the
sky, or we perceive only a sliver of photograph hidden beneath a pile of papers.
There may be atypical cases of object perception in which we perceptually attribute temporal
boundness to objects. Some objects that we perceive have short lifespans which we are often
presented with in their entirety. We often perceive the full lifespan of a flame produced by a
lighter, a bubble produced by a bubble wand, and a homemade sandwich. These objects persist
for such a short period of time that it is not unusual for us to perceive their coming-into-being,
their persisting across time, and their ceasing-to-be. In this type of case, it may be that we
perceptually attribute temporal boundness to the object itself, wherein we perceptually treat the
object itself as having a beginning and end in time. Alternatively, it may be that we perceptually
attribute temporal boundness only to some event that the object participates in, such as ‘the
lighting of the lighter’, ‘the blowing of the bubble’, or ‘having lunch’. Even if we do perceptually
attribute temporal boundness to short-lived objects, most of the objects that we are presented
with are not short-lived, and object perception in these cases is notably more similar to event
perception than is typical.
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I have argued that we typically perceptually attribute temporal boundness to events (though,
in certain cases, we might not), and we atypically perceptually attribute temporal boundness to
objects (though, in certain cases, we might). This is interesting because it suggests that our
perceptual system does not treat all properties as generic items to be attributed to one individual
or another. Instead, our perceptual system appears to respect some of the differences between
objects and events enough to maintain a distinction between which properties typically belong to
which type of individual. In addition to temporal boundness, there may be many other properties
that are typically perceptually attributable to events but not to objects.

3.3 Future Directions
We perceive events. Our perceptual representations of events are not token-identical to object or
property representations. They are sui generis. This is what enables us to perceive events as
discrete individuals, with discrete sets of objects and properties in the scene as participants. If
event representations were token-identical to sets of property representations, to single, rich
property representations, or to object representations within a given timeframe, they would not
do this work. Given that event representations are sui generis, it is possible for them to bind
representations of properties for events that we do not perceive as having any objects as
participants, as well as representations of event-specific properties.
One event-specific property that we typically attribute to events is temporal boundness. We
typically perceptually treat events as having a beginning and end in time, even if we are not
presented with their beginning or end. We typically do not perceptually treat objects as being
temporally bound, but instead as persisting indefinitely. Only in atypical cases of event
perception – like perceiving just a snippet of an event, or just a part of a long event – might we
not attribute temporal boundness to the events, and only in atypical cases of object perception –
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like perceiving an object with a very short lifespan – might we attribute temporal boundness to
the objects. There may be other properties that we typically perceptually attribute only to events,
or only to objects.
It would be fruitful to explore several other issues as they relate to event perception. One
issue is the relationship between event perception and other perceptual phenomena that are
natural candidates for event perception, such as perception of causation, perception of action,
and perception of change. Insofar as all instances of causation, action, and change either are
events themselves or are at least parts of larger events, it is prima facie plausible that perception
of causation, action, and change would thus count as forms of event perception. Yet just because
something is an event in the world and is somehow perceptible does not mean that we
perceptually treat it as an event. For instance, it is not obvious that all perceptible changes count
as ordinary events – or, more relevantly, that they are similar enough to ordinary events for us to
perceptually treat them as an event, as opposed to a mere change in objects or properties. If an
object undergoes a very slight but perceptible change in location, e.g., it is not clear that we
would treat this change as an individual in itself, nor that we would attribute temporal boundness
to it. In any case, it would be valuable to explore to what extent perception of change, as well as
perception of causation and action, will qualify as event perception.
Relatedly, it would be fruitful to investigate the limits of event perception. What are the
smallest events – temporally and/or spatially – that we perceptually treat as events, rather than as
mere objects and properties? If a single perceptible change in properties is not sufficient, then
maybe a sequence of a few, related perceptible changes in an object is. And what are the
spatiotemporally largest events that we perceptually treat as events? There is, surely, a cap on
what our perceptual system can classify as an event, but it’s not clear where it lies. Perhaps events
longer than a day, or a few hours, or even one hour are too large for us to perceptually treat as
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events. At most, we would be able to perceptually treat their sub-events as events. Similarly, just
how much of a given event (that we indeed perceptually treat as an event) must we be presented
with in order to perceptually attribute temporal boundness to it? It is unclear what the necessary
amount and type of information is for us to treat an event not only as an individual (that is
distinct from any of the objects we perceive to participate in the event), but also as having the
property of beginning and ending in time. What the limits of event perception are is primarily an
empirical matter, so pursuing empirical research directed at discovering these limits would be
beneficial.
Another issue is just how rich our perceptual representations of events are. This issue may be
particularly relevant when thinking about how action perception relates to event perception.
When presented with the event of two people having a conversation, how much information do
we perceptually represent as features of the event? Can we perceptually represent the two people
as people, or can we merely perceptually represent them as two objects (with a given shape, size,
location, etc.)? Can we perceptually represent their emotions, intentions, personalities, and the
like, or can we merely perceptually represent more basic properties, like their sizes and shapes? If
we can only perceptually represent fairly basic objects and properties, then our event
representation of the conversation will be quite basic as well, in which case we’d seem not to
represent the conversation as such. Discovering which types of events we can perceptually
represent as such – e.g., rich events like conversations and weddings, or basic events like
movements and lightings – may give us a better sense of the richness of our perceptual
experience generally.
Many other issues would be fruitful to explore as well, such as what the relation is between
our perceptual representations of a given event and its sub-events, how event perception might
differ in each modality that we perceive events by means of, and to what extent our knowledge of
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a given type of event influences our perception of that type of event. Event perception, thus, is a
rich topic for further philosophical exploration.
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